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This report analyzes the importance of the hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia. The oil and gas 
sector currently represents a vital component of the Bolivian economy, accounting for 7 
percent of the GDP in term of production and more than 30 percent of total government 
income. In addition, the hydrocarbon sector not only represents an important economic sector 
but also a political and social instrument for negotiations, mobilization and social 
participation. The hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia also plays a strategic geopolitical role in 
South America as it has the second largest reserves of natural gas in the region after 
Venezuela. However, the current Bolivian nationalization process has placed this privileged 
position of the country into question as Bolivia is trying to undo twenty years of neo-liberal 
policies with the adoption of more nationalistic policies, assuming the control of the sector 
and challenging the international community and the private sector to benefit its population. 
 
The report also exposes that the important hydrocarbon revenues are not evenly distributed 
across the country’s regions.  The most important instruments of taxation, royalties and the 
IDH, are creating a disequilibrium implying that regions with large   populations get 
considerably fewer resources than less populated regions.  In addition, the current distribution 
system, which is based on political criteria with some regional notion of fairness, is 
discriminatory in the allocation of resources with out taking into account poverty criteria.  In a 
poor country like Bolivia with a strong political framework on poverty alleviation, the lack of 
poverty criteria in the distribution system of such significant resources makes 1.5 million poor 
people from La Paz get fewer resources than 300 thousand poor people from Pando in terms 
of per capita distribution ($16 dollars per capita in La Paz vs. $600 dollars per capita in 
Pando). 
 
The report has found that the distribution system of the hydrocarbon revenues needs serious 
changes to be more efficient and accomplish the goal of poverty reduction.   The current 
system of revenue allocation creates significant per capita inequalities between regions and 
exacerbates the regional dependency on central transfers that depends on exhaustible and 
unstable hydrocarbon production (92 percent of the prefecturas’ revenues and 66 percent of 
the municipalities’ revenues come from government transfers).   In addition, the 
decentralization process of the country has several weaknesses.   It does not allow local 
governments to create their own tributary policies and generate their own resources, with 
exception of municipalities that to some extent can administrate and collect two regional taxes 
defined by the central government. 
 
This disequilibrium has the potential to seriously threaten the unity of the country as a nation.  
This situation will encourage producing regions to push for a large degree of decentralization 
in order to take advantage of the enormous inflows of resources that the sector is generating.  
In addition, non-producing regions will push for a significant share of those large resources 
given the severe degree of poverty in the country.  This leads to two important questions to 
ask; first, who owns the natural resources, producing regions or the central government, and 
second, how those revenues should be distributed? 
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In general, those questions are hard to answer and in most cases the answers have significant 
political notions.  In this aspect, the report presents results of a hypothetical calculation in 
which we combine to some extent the notion that producing regions have the right to a share 
of the revenues as does the central government.   Because producing regions have solid 
arguments to claim ownership, like natural heritage and social cost reimbursement, we found 
undesirable and unviable the idea of completely draining those resources from 
them. Nonetheless, the central government also has significant arguments to have a share of 
those revenues, like income stability, fiscal equilibrium and macroeconomic 
considerations. Therefore, we found it important that the central government should benefit 
from a share of the natural wealth.   However, the results of the hypothetical exercise 
presented in this report have the objective of opening the debate and dialogue for needed 
changes in the Bolivian hydrocarbon distribution system rather than suggesting a definitive 
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For the last twenty years, Bolivia, one of the poorest countries in South America, was 
influenced by the neo liberal economic model guided by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB).  In the process, Bolivia implemented deep structural 
changes in its economy, like intense capitalization
1 of the major national enterprises.   
Following this initiative, the government passed legislation to regulate the decentralization 
process of the administration and spending capacity of local governments.  These policies 
together were expected to lead to growth and stability by open markets and inflows of foreign 
investment. 
 
In this process of restructuring the economy of the country, in 1994, former president of 
Bolivia Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada passed Law 1544 “Capitalization Law”, which 
authorized the Executive Branch the sale of 50 percent of the state company’s shares (Barja, 
McKenzie, and Urquiola, 2005).  Two years later, in 1996, Law 1689, a new hydrocarbon 
law, was created to regulate and normalize the hydrocarbon activities in the country, adjusting 
the production and management of the oil and gas sector to the new political reforms that 
follow an economic liberalization.   
 
Until that year, the state oil company, YPFB (Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos) 
had all the rights to explore, extract, industrialize and commercialize natural gas and oil in 
Bolivia, and after that year, progressively YPFB became a regulator of the sector rather than 
an active participant on the sector production and commercialization.  Since then, the 
Hydrocarbons Law was subject of many debates about the distribution of the benefits of gas 
and oil, and the potential favoritism with the Hydrocarbon Law toward transnational 
corporations. 
 
However, Law 1689 and subsequent foreign investment allowed the discovery of significant 
reserves of natural gas in southern Bolivia, while the discussions within the country were 
further complicated by the rise of oil prices and conflicts related to ownership, 
commercialization and distribution of natural gas revenues.   
 
On October of 2003, a social crisis erupted, many conflicts arose after the government 
announced the possibility of building a pipeline from Bolivia to Chile where gas would have 
to be processed and liquefied before being shipped to Mexico and United States.  This plan 
was heavily opposed by the Bolivian population; first because the resentment still alive based 
on the Pacific War of 1879 in which Bolivia lost its sea coast with Chile and its access to the 
Pacific Ocean.  And second, because under the current Law 1689, Bolivia would still be a raw 
material exporter selling gas with any value added. 
 
Under these circumstances, the Bolivian population went on strike denying the government’s 
plan and demanding the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector, the domestic energy 
                                                 
1 Capitalization is a process where state companies are divided in three independent parts: the state, whish is the 
Bolivian society through their pension fund, workers of the remaining enterprise and the private sector.  In this 
process, 50% of the former state company’s shares are sold to the private sector that becomes the new 
administrator of the company; the other 50% is divided between Bolivians and workers.  
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demand being met and the industrialization of natural gas in Bolivia before export.  And after 
the so called Bolivian Gas War
2, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was obliged to abdicate his 
office.  As a result, his vice president, Carlos de Meza Gisbert, took office in 2003.  He called 
for an Energy Referendum in 2004 (Box 01) and for a popular agreement on the usage, 
exports of Bolivian natural gas reserves and, in addition, whether to nationalize the sector. 
 
In May 2005, the Bolivia government passed Law 3058, a new version of the Hydrocarbon 
Law, repealing the former Law 1689.  The new law was to ensure a more equitable 
distribution of the benefits of gas and oil and gain control of the production chain of the 
hydrocarbon sector by the state.  However, in June, 2005, due to the growing social crisis and 
the popular demand for a complete nationalization of the oil and gas sector, Carlos de Meza 
Gisbert had to abdicate the office and Eduardo Rodriguez Veltze, his successor in the office, a 
transitional government, called for new presidential elections. 
 
Now, since the presidential elections in December 2005, Bolivia is experiencing a new 
political wave.  The political party, Movement towards Socialism, took office on January 26
th 
2006, marking the beginning of new, potentially transforming policies and practices of 
government: 
 
We plan to enter into a new era of government by recovering and industrializing 
the non-renewable and renewable natural resources, supporting a sustainable 
exploitation and extraction of these resources and pursuing that the benefits are 
distributed directly to Bolivians (Movimiento al Socialismo, 2006). 
 
On May, 2006, the newly elected president, Evo Morales Ayma, who is considered the first 
indigenous president in Bolivia, placed the Bolivian hydrocarbon sector under state control by 
passing the Supreme Decree
3 of Nationalization 28701.  The decree obliges all transnational 
and international companies to return to the state, through YPFB, the production of oil and 
gas fields and sign new contracts ensuring a greater percentage of the gas revenues for the 
state and reasonable profit for the oil companies. 
 
Under this decree of nationalization, companies had a 180-day transition period to renegotiate 
and sign new contracts with YPFB if they want to operate in Bolivia, otherwise, they must 
leave the country.  At the same time, the new president also guaranteed that this 
nationalization process would not take on the form of expropriation or confiscation of 
facilities, but clearly stated that “Bolivia wants partners in business not bosses.” (Evo 
Morales’ speech to the United Nations, September 22, 2006) 
 
                                                 
2 The Bolivian Gas War was a social conflict in 2003 centering on the exploitation and export of natural gas, 
which is the second largest reserve in South America.  750,000 people, most of them indigenous surrounded La 
Paz city for three days causing fuel and food shortage.  Protestors were against the government export policies of 
gas via Chile to Mexico and the United States.  They also were against gas exportation with out industrialization.  
However, these were not the only cause of the blocked.  Among the concerns were also the coca eradication 
policies pushed by the government of the United States.  The excessive violence used by the military led 80 
deaths and the president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada was forced to abdicate office. 
3 A Supreme Decree is an authoritative order having the force of law passed by the Executive Branch in order to 
regulate and apply the law.  A Supreme Decree does not have to be approved by the congress.  
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Box 01: The 2004 Energy Referendum 
 
The Energy Referendum of 2004 was a consultation process done by the Electoral 
National Court over hydrocarbon policies.  The population decided whether to export 
its natural gas to Mexico and the United States via Chile, the process of 
nationalization, the new hydrocarbon tributary system to collect the gas revenues and 
a strategy to attend the Chilean demand for gas in exchange of a sovereign port in the 
Pacific Ocean.  Through the energy referendum the population was asked to answer 
five questions that would set the basis for the changes of the Bolivian hydrocarbon 
policy.  The questions were: 
1.  Do you agree with the repeal of the Hydrocarbon Law # 1689 passed by 
President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada? 
2.  Do you agree with the recovery of the hydrocarbons at the well head for the 
state? 
3.  Do you agree with the foundation of YPFB, for the second time, to recover 
ownership of its shares that were sold to the international companies and 
therefore participate in the whole production chain of the hydrocarbon 
activities in the country? 
4.  Do you agree with President Carlos Mesa on using gas as a strategic 
mechanism to recover a sovereign port in the Pacific Ocean? 
5.  Do you agree with exporting gas under a national policy that: 
•  Fulfills the domestic demand of gas consumption 
•  Encourages the industrialization of gas on Bolivian territory 
•  Charges taxes and royalties to the oil companies reaching no less than 50 
percent of production value of gas to be used on education, health, 
infrastructure and employment? 
After the polls, the Electoral National Court reported that only 60 percent of the 
population that is able to vote went to polls.  The results of the referendum are the 
following: 
 
Questions Yes % No % Total
1 1,788,694 86.64 275,742 13.36 2,064,436
2 1,913,642 92.19 162,130 7.81 2,075,772
3 1,793,594 87.31 260,610 12.69 2,054,204
4 1,055,529 54.80 870,772 45.20 1,926,301
5 1,179,893 61.74 731,021 38.26 1,910,914
 
At the end of the negotiations, transnational oil companies agreed to sign new contracts with 
the Bolivian government.  With these contracts, the state has recovered control of the energy 
sector and increases the government take of the hydrocarbon revenues to more than 70 
percent (“La Razón”, “El Diario”, 2006). 
 
These new contracts mark a new era for the hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia with the generation 
of enormous amounts of income for the state.  With these events, Bolivia not only has 
significant amounts of resources to fund its social expenditures but also a major responsibility 
of managing and distributing the hydrocarbon wealth through its different levels of sub 
governments to accomplish the goal of reducing poverty and promoting the inclusion of the  
indigenous people of Bolivia.  
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That said this report seeks to understand and answer the questions: What are the criteria for 
the collection and allocation of the resources from hydrocarbons?  How are hydrocarbon 
revenues distributed in Bolivia?  In this report the term of hydrocarbon revenues involved not 
only royalties but also specific sector taxes that contribute to the state.  The report also seeks 
to explore to what extent these revenues support poverty alleviation strategies and policies 
within the central and local governments.  Finally, a further objective of the report is to 
explore the level of decentralization and dependency on government transfers from the gas 
and oil sector and its impact on Bolivian public policies. 
 
The report begins the analysis with a historical description of the Bolivian hydrocarbon 
sector.  Sections 2 and 3 explore the beginning of the hydrocarbon activity in the country.  
They describe the growing importance of natural gas for the country and briefly explores the 
differences between natural gas and different energy sources.  Section 4 describes in a 
comparative manner the tributary system of current hydrocarbon legislation with former one.  
Sections 5 and 6 describe the Bolivian mechanisms and instruments to generate income.   
Then, section 7 describes the importance of the hydrocarbon revenues compared with other 
sectors of the Bolivian economy.  Section 8 explores the criteria for distribution of the 
sector’s revenues, its influence on the budgetary system of local governments and the level of 
dependence on central government transfers.  Finally, section 9 analyze and discusses the 
findings, briefly explores the expenditure capacity of local governments and the uses of the 
hydrocarbon revenues on social policies in order to make relevant conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
The methodology used to write this report was, in the first place, data collection and review of 
the literature (papers and reports) related to the situation of the oil and gas sector in Bolivia.  
Since poverty alleviation is partially a function of access to and distribution of resources, an 
important part of the methodology was the search for relevant data that would allow mapping 
generation of benefits from natural gas and how such benefits are distributed to local 
governments.  The sources used to collect data included libraries and the internet.  However, 
due to the difficulty of accessing information, especially in developing countries like Bolivia, 
a field trip to Bolivia was essential to gather information and to ensure its accuracy and the 
inclusion of local input in the research. 
 
The main outcome of the field trip was the access to and inclusion of primary and secondary 
information in addition to accurate and updated data in order to make the evidence discussed 
as robust as possible.  However, because the nationalization of the Bolivian hydrocarbon 
sector is an ongoing situation, and the government currently is in internal negotiations to 
reform the distribution system of revenues, it is not possible to measure specific impacts of 
the sector on social and economic outcomes.
4  Therefore, it is important for the reader to take 
note of the limitation to the approach taken in this report due to the period of analysis. 
                                                 
4 In this regard, using a CGE model of the Bolivian economy, a study has been done on the distributional impact 
of natural gas resources by Lykke E. Andersen (2006).  The study simulates possible changes in the Bolivian 
economy due to the increase of natural gas exports focusing on the changes in income distribution between 
different types of households without geographical dimension.  
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2. The Hydrocarbon Sector
5 
 
In the 1930’s, the hydrocarbon sector of Bolivia became an important part of its economy.  
The state became an important player on this sector after the War of Chaco (1932-1935) 
which was a conflict involving Bolivians and Paraguayans over the territory of El Chaco 
located in the southeast of Bolivia.  The Chaco region geographically is divided in two 
sections, north and southern Chaco.  At the end of the war, Bolivia had lost the southern part 
of El Chaco to Paraguay.  The region of El Chaco is a territory with high probability of having 
important hydrocarbon reserves, which was one of the most important causes of the war.  
However, until now significant natural gas reserves were only found in the Bolivian part and 
not in the Paraguayan side. 
 
Before 1920’s, Bolivia did not have any regulation on hydrocarbon activities.  During those 
years any person, citizen or foreign, could request concessions with out limit to explore and 
produce petroleum.  The first hydrocarbon law was signed in 1921 under the name of Organic 
Law of Petroleum.  This law set a maximum of 100,000 hectares as concession and creates a 
set of patents to be paid and a royalty of 11 percent of the production.  Even though the 
Organic Law of Petroleum set a maximum of hectares to be exploited, Standard Oil, an 
American oil company, got the monopoly of the sector with almost 7 million hectares. 
 
During the War of Chaco and in order to finance the conflict, the government of Bolivia 
requested the support and loans of every enterprise that was operating in the country including 
Standard Oil.  Nonetheless, Standard Oil had denied any aid to Bolivia, even the supply of 
gasoline for the air force, and in addition in advance royalty payments.  Furthermore, 
Standard Oil started to remove equipment and ship them to its facilities in Argentina. 
 
Then, to the Bolivian government’s surprise, in 1935, the government of Argentina informed 
it about illicit exports of petroleum from Standard Oil Bolivia to the Standard Oil Argentina in 
1925 and 1926.  Based on these accusations the government of Bolivia ordered an 
investigation of the case.  As a result, Standard Oil Argentina confessed they imported 
petroleum from its subsidiary in Bolivia.  Finally Standard Oil Bolivia admitted they had been 
exporting petroleum to Argentina through a clandestine pipe they built from Bolivia to 
Argentina.  However, they argued that there is no illegal action in this export because the 
petroleum belongs to them and the only dishonest behavior was to elude the royalty payments 
on that production. 
 
Under these circumstances, in 1936, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos, YPFB, 
was created as the state oil company in charge of exploration, exploitation and 
commercialization of hydrocarbons within Bolivian territory.  And the first nationalization of 
the hydrocarbon sector took place right after the end of the Chaco War, in 1937. 
 
With the creation of YPFB, the government of Bolivia ordered the caducity of the Standard 
Oil concessions and contracts and took over its facilities to get control of petroleum 
production.  However, Standard Oil appealed to reverse the nationalization process and in 
                                                 
5 Most of this section was based on the Libro de Oro YPFB (Golden Book of YPFB) and the YPFB’s reports 
1999, 2001, 2006.  
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1942, it forced the Bolivian government to pay $1.75 million, as indemnification, for the 
devolution of technical documentation that Standard Oil had kept after the nationalization. 
 
By 1941, YPFB, under state control, was a consolidated oil company supplying more than 30 
percent of the domestic market and generating revenues of $17 million for the country.   
During the 1940’s and 1950’s the hydrocarbon activity in Bolivia became very successful for 
the country.  Bolivia became a net petroleum exporter with all its domestic demand satisfied.  
However, the hydrocarbon activities of exploration and exploitation demanded heavy 
investment and Bolivia did not have enough economic capacity to satisfy the needs of a 
growing YPFB and at the same time meet the needs of its population. 
 
Therefore, in 1955, the government passed a new law called the Petroleum Code or 
Davenport Code with the addition of a new tax accounting for 30 percent of the company’s 
profits.  The new legislation repealed the Organic Law of Petroleum.  This new legislation 
also allowed foreign companies to sign joint operational contracts with YPFB and 14 foreign 
oil companies entered Bolivia including the Gulf Oil Company from the United States. 
 
During the 1960’s the production of hydrocarbons started to decrease.  The Argentinean 
market for natural gas, however, was willing to sign a purchase-sale contract with Bolivia to 
satisfy its growing domestic market.  Therefore, the Bolivian Gulf Company and YPFB joint 
in a mix company with 50 percent of shares for each to deliver natural gas to Argentina.  
However, in 1969, the government of former president Alfredo Ovando Candia decreed the 
nationalization of the Gulf Oil Company arguing that the contracts were damaging the 
Bolivian economy.  The technical argument for that nationalization was that the Gulf Oil 
never paid the 30 percent utility tax during its time of operation in the country arguing that it 
was discounted from its investments. 
 
Since the application of the Davenport Code, Bolivia had changed its hydrocarbon legislation 
four times following the political program of former governments: in 1972 with the General 
Law of Hydrocarbons, in 1990 with Law 1194, in 1996 with Law 1689 that facilitated the 
capitalization of YPFB and finally in 2005 with the current Hydrocarbon Law 3058 that 
allowed the latest nationalization. 
 
3. The Bolivian Natural Gas
6,  
 
Historically, Bolivia is characterized by its strong dependence on specific primary 
commodities, from silver to tin and then natural gas.  During the decades of 1930 to 1970, tin 
represented an important commodity for the Andean country, accounting for more than 60 
percent of its exports (Andersen and Meza, 2001).  However, that period of tin-dependence 
ended in 1985 when the international tin market collapsed leaving an overwhelmed Bolivian 
                                                 
6 One thing that is worth to point out here is that Bolivia is not a Petroleum producing country.  On the contrary, 
it is a gas producing country by excellence.  Even though Bolivia has significant oil reserves, its vast reserves of 
natural gas placed the country as second country with the largest reserves of natural gas in America after 
Venezuela.  Bolivia holds the highest non-associated gas reserves in the region, which means that its reserves are 
mostly of free gas compared with Venezuela where half of its natural gas reserves are associated with other 
gases that increases the overall cost to process of producing liquids (Medinaceli, 2004; Furtado et.al., 2006).  
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economy that reached the most severe economic crisis in its history.  During the decade of the 
1980’s, Bolivia was facing a collapsed tin market on one side but on the other side, increasing 
oil prices
7.  Consequently, there was a new opportunity for natural gas (Box 02). 
 
Bolivia through its state-owned oil company, YPFB, started its natural gas exports to 
Argentina in 1972 with a 20-year contract that was progressively updated until 1999.  For 27 
years, Bolivia’s natural gas exports were dependent on Argentina as its sole buyer.  In 1995, 
however, Argentina’s proven natural gas reserves increased threefold over 1970 levels 
(Campodonico, 1999).  Bolivia was facing the inevitable end of gas sales to Argentina that 
ended its dependence on Bolivian gas in 1999.  But in the mean while, Bolivia had begun 
negotiations with Brazil to export natural gas in 1991.  It was not until 1999, however, that the 
Brazilian market completely replaced the Argentinean one. 
 


































































In 1996, a new hydrocarbon law (1689) was approved with attractive incentives for private oil 
companies to invest on the oil and gas sector of the country.  This new law, jointly with the 
Capitalization Law of 1994, allowed the breakup and capitalization process of the state-own 
oil company (YPFB), which progressively abandoned its entrepreneurial role in the 
hydrocarbon sector and became merely the regulator of the sector. 
 
The government proceeded by inviting foreign oil companies to invest in the sector in return 
for 50 percent of shares and more than 80 percent of the value of production in its favor.  The 
private companies, on their side, promised to invest in the sector at least to the capitalization 
value within the first 8 years.  In this sense, YPFB was divided into three different companies, 
each one consisting of a consortium of transnational companies.  Two of the companies were 
                                                 
7 Due to the lack of a world gas standard pricing mechanism, it is very common that prices of natural gas get 
linked to a basket of different oil prices.  This aspect makes the gas market fluctuate, following the international 
oil prices.  
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created for activities of exploration and production; and the other for activities of 
transportation. 
 
These reforms, led by former president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, redefined the respective 
roles played by the government and the private sector liberalizing the economy of the country 
following neo-liberal policies largely adopted worldwide after World War II.  As a result, 
natural gas reserves increased enormously making Bolivia the country in the region with the 
second largest natural gas reserves after Venezuela. 
 

































































PROVEN  PROBABLES  POSSIBLES  POTENTIAL RESERVES
 
 
By 2005, the reforms were very successful in terms of direct foreign investment to the 
country.  There was an apparent improvement of the oil sector during the last 10 years where 
proven/probable and possible natural gas reserves augmented enormously from 14.1 in 1999 
to 63.9 TCF in 2005, (Figure 02) while the gas exports to Brazil have increased almost five 
fold over 1999 levels.  In addition, there was a reopening of the Argentinean market in 2004.  
Despite all these factors that pointed to the apparent improvement in the sector, there were 
serious concerns about the benefits of these exports. 
 
The major concerns were especially about the tributary system of Law 1689 and the 
government’s share of the natural gas revenues upon which a significant part of total 
government’s revenues depends.  The root of these concerns were on one hand, the royalty 
collection system, which allocates a large share of hydrocarbon revenues to oil companies, 82 
percent, rather than the government itself, 18 percent. 
 
Another concern was that the new legislation did not promote any industrialization of natural 
gas making the country highly dependent on raw material exports.  This situation jeopardizes 
the inflows of natural gas revenues in the country due to the fluctuating income through 
royalties that depend on international oil prices (Andersen and Meza, 2001).  In other words,  
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Box 02: Natural gas markets and its particularities 
 
Natural gas has become a unique commodity for which demand has grown very fast during 
the last twenty years.  Compared with other fossil fuels, natural gas has a very different 
market path and commercialization.  First of all, because of its gaseous state, it cannot be 
stored in large quantities without high costs.  What is more, its distribution requires large 
amounts of capital investment that makes its transportation cost account for almost 50 
percent of the total final consumer price while transportation costs for oil represent 5 to 10 
percent of its final price (D’aponte, 2003). 
 
Another difference between gas and other fossil fuels is the nature of their respective 
markets.  Due to the high cost of transporting gas from the production to the consumption 
area, there is no global market for it.  The gas trade is done largely at the regional level where 
the gas is produced and therefore there is no world standard pricing mechanism like in the oil 
market with the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and other benchmarks in oil pricing.  The 
gas price is set at the city gate, which is geographic point chose in agreement by the gas 
exporter country and the importer one. 
 
In addition, natural gas is always competing with other energy substitutes.  In terms of 
domestic demand there are electricity, heating oil and Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG).  In terms 
of industrial demand there are coal and oil.  In terms of electricity generation there are again 
oil, coal, nuclear energy and hydropower.  Therefore, pricing policies are very important for 
the natural gas market due to the variety of available substitutes. 
 
Each section of the production chain of natural gas is strongly connected, with each having a 
very important role to play, from the wellhead to the final consumer.  Therefore, small and 
remote discoveries of natural gas are not viable due to the high cost required.  In addition, 
due to its capital-intensive characteristics, gas production cannot be developed without a 
serious long-term commitment between producers and consumers; otherwise, the investment 
is not viable.  
 
Another important difference when compared with other fossil fuels is that natural gas 
production is driven by demand rather than by production.  In other words, there has to be a 
considerable demand to justify the huge amounts of investment that production requires 
throughout its different stages, beginning at the wellhead and continuing through its 
transportation and delivery to the final consumer. 
as Bolivia is highly dependent on gas income, changes in the international oil prices would 
hurt its economic stability. 
 
On the other hand, as a major concern among the population, there was also the uneven 
distribution of gas benefits within the Bolivian regions, producing and non producing 
departments.  All these concerns erupted in several conflicts related to the hydrocarbon sector.  
These conflicts tragically ended up in the Bolivian gas war, the resignation of two presidents 






4. Tributary System of the Hydrocarbon Legislation 
 
With the approval of the Law 3058 in 2005, the government made considerable efforts to 
improve the tributary system that governs the hydrocarbon sector on behalf of the Bolivian 
population.  These changes were made as a result of several conflicts that created tension in 
Bolivia’s political, social and economic stability.  With the new version of the hydrocarbon 
law, the government repealed former Law 1689, which was the cause of concerns and social 




In general terms, since the capitalization of YPFB and Law 1689, the state-owned company 
could not be part of the decision making process on any of the stages of the production chain 
of the hydrocarbon industry.  YPFB was divided in three companies with less than 50 percent 
of shares.  In addition, former Law 1689 also had divided the total hydrocarbon production 
into new and existing hydrocarbons.
9   
 
For existing hydrocarbons, it was stipulated that 11 percent of the gross hydrocarbon 
production at the wellhead, be allocated as departmental royalty, which was payable for the 
benefit of the department
10 where the production originates. 
 
Law 1689 had also set a compensatory national royalty of 1 percent of the gross hydrocarbon 
production at the well head for the benefit of Beni and Pando, the poorest departments of the 
country.  It had also stipulated 6 percent participation in favor of YPFB that should be 
transferred to the Nation’s General Treasury after deducting the necessary funds to cover 
YPFB’s budget for the administration of contracts. 
 
                                                 
8 For a detail discussion of prices and market conditions during 1990-2005 see Medinaceli (2003) and  (2004), 
Napoleon Pacheco (2006) and Villegas (2004) 
9 Law 1689 had classified, at first, as new hydrocarbons those hydrocarbons of reservoirs whose production 
begins from the date of the enactment of the law.  And as existing hydrocarbons the ones from reservoirs that are 
in production at the date of the enactment of the law.  Many of the natural gas fields including the mega fields 
San Alberto and San Antonio (the largest reserves of natural gas in Bolivia) were discovered before Law 1689 
was applied.  They were already in production but with smaller proven reserves and bigger probable reserves as 
in the case of San Alberto (YPFB’s Golden Book: 1936-1996; Villegas: 2003 p. 84-89).  This situation did not 
favor oil companies due to the share of royalties charged to existing hydrocarbons (50%).  Therefore, oil 
companies put pressure on the government to change that situation conditioning investment.  Finally, two 
months after Law 1689 was enacted, the government passed Law 1731 that modified the definition for new and 
existing hydrocarbons.  The critical issue of Law 1689 was that it classified hydrocarbons in terms of production, 
proven and probable reserves.  On the other hand, Law 1731 had divided the Bolivian gas reserves on new 
hydrocarbon and existing hydrocarbons taking into account production activities and only proven reserves.   
Since then, existing hydrocarbons are the hydrocarbons corresponding to the proven reserves of reservoirs that 
are in production at the date of the enactment of the present law and certified to the 30th of April of 1996 (the 
day when Law 1689 was enacted) by specialized companies on the basis of norms generally accepted in the 
petroleum industry.  Contrarily, new hydrocarbons are all hydrocarbons not contained in the existing 
hydrocarbon definition.  
10 Bolivia is politically divided in nine departments as sub governments: La Paz, Oruro, Potosi, Pando, Beni, 
Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, Tarija and Santa Cruz.  
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Figure 03: Production of Petroleum and Natural Gas according 
to New and Existing Fields
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*
* Period of Analysis before Law 3058
Source: Data from the 
Ministry of Hydrocarbons
Company's share
RNC and PN (existing hydrocarbons/Law1689) 
Participation YPFB 6% 
Departmental Royalties 12%
It also established a complementary National Royalty payable to the Nation’s General 
Treasury on the production of existing hydrocarbons, which was equivalent to 13 percent of 
the value of the production. 
 
Finally, it also stipulated a participation of 19 percent contribution to the benefit of the 
Nation’s General Treasury, which was on behalf of YPFB in the previous provision, Law 
1194.  Together, royalties and participations amounted to 50 percent to the government for 
existing hydrocarbons. 
 
On the other hand, in terms of new hydrocarbons, Law 1689 had stipulated a departmental 
royalty on behalf of the producer departments of 11 percent of the gross production value.  A 
compensatory national royalty for Beni and Pando of 1 percent and a 6 percent participation 
on behalf of YPFB, which is transferable to the Nation’s General Treasury with the same 
characteristics as for existing hydrocarbons. 
 
  Consequently, for new 
hydrocarbons, the 
government accounted 
only for 18 percent of 
its gross production 
value since 1996.  As 
previously mentioned, 
this classification of 
new and existing 





since the discovery of 
enormous natural gas 
reserves that will 
contribute with only 18 
percent of its production.  
The proportion of 
existing and new 
hydrocarbons in 1997 
was 67/33 for oil and 
87/13 for natural gas, 
whereas in 2005 was 13/90 for oil and 9/91 for natural gas.  This unfavorable situation 
reduced the government’s take in revenues from 33 percent in 2000 to 19 percent in 2005 
before the creation of Law 3058 (Figure 04), which exacerbated tensions in the population 

















Despite the successful strategy of attracting direct foreign investment to the sector with 
Capitalization Law 1544 and the vast incentives for transnational corporations to operate in 
the country with Law 1689, the latter lacks adequate mechanisms
11 for the progressive 
reversal process of the unfavorable situation for the country in terms of the royalty system 
where 18 percent of the value of production is for the state and 82 percent is for companies 
taking into account that existing hydrocarbons will disappear as new hydrocarbons are 
discovered (Figure 03). 
 
In terms of measures to inject capital to the sector and boost the upstream activities, the 
former law was a complete success.  Between 1997 and 2005, foreign direct investment was 
higher than $4 billion just in this sector (Furtado et.al., 2006).  Furthermore, these favorable 
conditions for foreign investment and transnational oil companies allowed the dramatic 
increase of proven and probable reserves, especially of natural gas, which represents the most 
important hydrocarbon resource for Bolivia.  Nonetheless, what is questionable is whether the 
government has benefited from this measure; and even more, if the Bolivian population itself 
has seen the benefits. McGuigan (2007), for example, has shown that the privatization of the 
Bolivian hydrocarbon sector has brought very limited benefit for the government and much 
more for foreign companies, while Andersen & Faris (2004) found that the natural gas boom 
contributes to an increase in inequality in the country. 
 
Law 3058 
On the other hand, Law 3058 had a popular mandate supported by the National Energy 
Referendum on taking back the control of the hydrocarbon sector to the state.  Furthermore, it 
stipulates the foundation for the second time of YPFB as the state-owned company to assume 
control of every stage of the hydrocarbon chain production (Articles 5 and 6). 
 
According to Law 3058, the new tributary system imposes a 50 percent share of hydrocarbon 
revenues on all fields within the Bolivian territory.  The new provision maintains the 18 
percent royalty share for every hydrocarbon without any distinction.  However, in addition to 
the 18 percent royalties, it stipulates the creation of the Direct Tax to Hydrocarbons/Impuesto 
Directo a los Hidrocarburos (IDH) to be applied within the Bolivian territory at the upstream 
level.  This new tax accounts for 32 percent of the total hydrocarbon production and is 
charged at the fiscal point
12.  Together, royalties and IDH must not be less than 50 percent of 
the total value of production on behalf of the state in accordance to article 8 of Law 3058. 
 
                                                 
11 Actually, in 1996, it was created a new tributary mechanism to reverse the unfavorable royalty system of 18 
percent for the government and 82 percent for companies.  This mechanism, SURTAX, taxes the extraordinary 
revenues collected by companies related to activities of exploitation of non renewable resources.  However, since 
1996, the government could not apply the tax and collect any income.  This mechanism is explained in more 
detail in other section. 
12 The fiscal point is the area where hydrocarbons are measured after they have been set up for transportation. 
Measures are according to: volume and density for petroleum, volume and heating power for natural gas and 
weight in metric tons for LPG.  For those fields that do count with extraction facilities of LPG and/or natural 
gasoline, the fiscal point is located at the end of the field just before the transportation pipeline system.  And for 
those fields which do not count with extraction facilities for LPG and or natural gasoline, the fiscal point is 
defined by the Article 138 of the Law 3058, which defined the fiscal point as the liquid/fluid separation system 
exit.  
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Law 3058 as in the previous one establishes royalties and participations as mechanisms for 
getting revenues from hydrocarbon production.  In this aspect, it defines a departmental 
royalty of 11 percent of the total departmental production at the fiscal point that has to be paid 
for the benefit of the department where the production originates. 
 
In addition, a compensatory national royalty of 1 percent of the total national production at 
the fiscal point that has to be paid for the benefit of the departments of Beni and Pando in two 
thirds and one third respectively.  This is in accordance with what is stipulated in Law 981 of 
March 7, 1988.  Finally, Law 3058 stipulates 6 percent participation in favor of the Nation’s 
General Treasury of the total production at the fiscal point.  It is important to point out that 
Law 3058 establishes that royalties and participations are not subject to any deduction for 
consumption, compensation or costs for exploration, exploitation and transportation at the 
fiscal point. 
 
In terms of revenue distribution and state control of the hydrocarbon sector and in contrast to 
current Law 3058, Law 1689 had allocated 6 percent of participation on behalf of YPFB, 
although its function was to be only an administrator of the contracts.  On the other hand, and 
even though Law 3058 gives back to YPFB the control of the whole chain production of the 
hydrocarbon sector, it did not allocate any monetary resource to the state-owned enterprise to 
perform such activity.  However, with the nationalization process of 2006, the lack of 
allocated resources for YPFB was taken into account and regulated by Supreme Decree 28701 
that created a transitory 32 percent share on behalf of YPFB while the negotiations of the new 
contracts were on the table. 
 
In this aspect, the Supreme Decree 28701 established a 180-day period of transition for 
foreign oil companies to renegotiate and sign new contracts with the new YPFB as major 
shareholder if they want to operate in Bolivia.  The nationalization decree mandates that 
during these 180 days those fields where the natural gas average certified production of year 
2005 has exceeded 100 MMCFD, the distribution of the value of the production will be 82 
percent for the benefit of the state and 18 percent for the benefit of the private companies.  In 
contrast, for those fields which the natural gas average certified production for the year 2005 
was less than 100 MMCFD, the current distribution of the value of the production, 50 percent, 
will remain the same in accordance to the Law 3058. 
 
This new distribution responds to the creation of a new 32 percent participation in favor of 
YPFB.  The YPFB’s share plus the 18 percent of royalties and the 32 percent IDH explained 
above, accounts for 82 percent for those high production fields.  This enormous inflow of 
resources to YPFB had the function of economically strengthen the state-owned company 
before take control of the hydrocarbon chain production during the transition period where the 
new contracts were under negotiations. 
 
According to YPFB’s statistics, by the end of 2005, ten companies were producing natural gas 
in 49 fields.  However, from those fields, only two fields have fulfilled the requirements of 
producing more than 100 MMCFD to pay the 32 percent participation on behalf of the state-
oil company.  Those fields are San Alberto with 310.35 MMCFD and Sabalo with 380.66  
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MMCFD.  These two fields are located in Tarija and are operated by Petrobras-Bolivia, a 
subsidiary of Petroleos de Brazil, which is the Brazilian state-oil company. 
 
After the negotiations, 44 new contracts were signed by all companies operating in Bolivia 
establishing a variable oil rent.    This variable system depends on variables like the amount of 
investment by oil companies, depreciation rates, paid taxes by oil companies that were not 
recognized as recoverable costs
13, and the volume of hydrocarbon produced. 
 
With this new formula, the government take comes from the oil rent
14 rather than from the 
gross production income.  In this sense, from the gross production income, every oil company 
will discount its operation cost.  This operation cost shall be calculated and submitted by each 
oil company to YPFB every month.  And YPFB shall audit the recoverable cost every three 
months.  From the remaining amount, the oil rent, the government will take in average around 
75 to 85 percent as revenues (50 percent from royalties and IDH and the rest is from YPFB’s 
participation) depending on the above-mentioned variables.  And the rest goes to the oil 
companies as profits. 
 
 
In other words, current contracts are Contracts of Operation.  This type of contracts, in 
general, specify that any individual or collective person, national or international, public or 
private could execute at their own risk and with their own resources activities of exploration 
and exploitation under the area specified by the contract.  It also stipulates that the contractor, 
in this case the company, shall give the gross production to YPFB with exception of the 
hydrocarbons used to facilitate the production.  YPFB shall pay the contractor its recoverable 
                                                 
13 According to the 44 contracts signed by oil companies and YPFB, every tax and contributions are consider as 
recoverable cost with exception of royalties, IDH and the enterprise utility tax (IUE).  
14 The oil rent is the result of taking off the company’s cost of operation from the gross value of the production. 
Figure 05: Variable Oil Rent System
Recoverable Cost 
of operation (1) 
100% of oil rent 
Company’s profit (2) 






(1)  The percentage presented is just estimation in order to explain the Oil Rent 
System based on the model contract between YPFB and oil companies 
(2)  The company’s profit will vary according to the level of their investment  
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cost of operation and from the remnant it shall pay first royalties, participations and IDH.  
Thereafter, YPFB shall divide the remnant as profits between the company and itself. 
 
On the other hand, the former 79 contracts are the type of Joint Venture Contracts.  These 
contracts specify that any individual or collective person, national or international, public or 
private could execute at their own risk and with their own resources activities of exploration, 
exploitation and commercialization of the hydrocarbons.  In these contracts, the contractor has 
the ownership of the hydrocarbons and therefore they shall pay royalties and participations 
(Villegas, 2004). 
 
However, these new contracts apparently have significant incentives for oil companies to 
increase their operation costs.  The fact that the operation costs will be considered recoverable 
by foreign companies suggests that it is very important for the government to have detailed 
and strong regulations about what is considering recoverable cost.  According to the new 
contracts, annex D and F explain in more detail the variable oil rent system and the 
considerations to take into account in defining these recoverable costs.  However, and despite 
these annexes, it is not clear what the limits are in order to claim specific operation costs as 
recoverable cost.  Therefore, unless Bolivia counts with strong and detailed regulations about 
this topic, it is very likely that foreign companies would increase their cost of operation as 
they know that they will be reimbursed. 
 
Table 01: Coparison Table of Revenue Share between Law 1689 and Law 3058 (1)
New Law 3058 & S.D. 28701
Existing Hydrocarbons New Hydrocarbons Hydrocarbons (2)
Departamental Royalty 11 11 11
National Royalty (Beni and Pando) 11 1
Complementary National Royalty 13 0 0
National Participation 19 0 6
YPFB Participation  66 25-35(3)
IDH 00 3 2
Total (4) 50 18 75-85
(4) In the new hydrocarbon legislation, the total government take varies depending on YPFB's participation (25-35%). However, the
governement's share through royalties, national participation and IDH should not be less than 50 percent of the hydrocarbon
production
(1) This table is taking into account only the revenue system collection regulated by the hydrocarbon legislation (Law 1689 from
1996 to 2005 and Law 3058 with the Supreme Decree 28701 since 2005 and 2006), which consist on royalties, participations and
IDH. It does not take into account income and contributions from the Bolivian general trybutary system which consist on different
direct and indirect taxes and tariffs at the national level    
Former Law 1689
Hydrocarbons revenues
(3) In the new provision, Law 3058 and S.D. 28701, YPFB participation varies according to different variables that depend on the
amount of investment, depreciation rates and paid taxes that were not recognized as recoverable costs, and the volume of gas
produced by oil companies




One thing that is also surprising in the new contracts is that they do not guarantee any 
recovery of investment cost and utilities due to its characteristics of risk operation contracts.  
YPFB will not assume any risk and responsibility regarding the exploration stage or the result 
of those until foreign companies have registered the hydrocarbons found as commercial and 
start their production.  The hydrocarbon reserves belong to the state and the production to 
YPFB.  This situation was completely the opposite with the former 79 joint venture contracts 
signed with Law 1689 where government guaranteed the recovery of investment costs and 






5. Other Taxes Applied to the Hydrocarbon Sector
15 
 
According to the Bolivian legislation, the hydrocarbon law regulates every activity of this 
sector including the collection of revenues for exploration and exploitation of the non 
renewable resource through royalties, participations, patents and the IDH.  However, this 
sector is also subject to direct and indirect national taxation as is stipulated in the tributary 
system of the Bolivian fiscal policy: Law 843 (current organized text), Law 1606 (Tributary 
Reform) and Law 1731 (Surtax Law). 
 
The general tributary system of Bolivia is regulated by Law 843 enacted in 1986, which was 
created as part of the strategy to cut off the hyperinflation and economic crisis of the early 
1980’s.  With its enactment, the Bolivian tributary system radically changed with the creation 
of seven taxes that are applied at the national level.  However, only four national taxes are 
applied to the hydrocarbon sector: Value Added Tax (IVA), Complementary Regime of the 
Added Value Tax (RC-IVA), Tax to Transactions (IT), and Tax to the Enterprise Profits 
(IUE).  In addition, there is a modification of the latter that tax the shipment of profits out of 






















                                                 
15 This section is not targeted to thoroughly analyze the general tributary system of Bolivia.  This section is 
introducing another source of income of the hydrocarbon sector in the country that is not related to any 
production activity.  The impact of the income generation capacity of the sector will be discussed in other section 
of the report. 
 





Royalties = 11%, 1% 
Participations = 6%, 25-35% 
IDH = 32% 
IUE = 25% 
IUE-RE = 12.5% 
IVA= 13% 
SURTAX = 25% 
Patents 
Wholesaler
IUE = 25% 
IUE-RE = 12.5% 
IVA= 13% 
IT = 3% 
Refineries
IEHD (retention agent) 
IUE = 25% 
IUE-RE = 12.5% 
IVA= 13% 
IT = 3% 
IEHD 
IUE = 25% 
IVA= 13% 




Law 843: IUE,  IUE  -  RE, IVA and IT  
Law 1731: SURTAX    
Law 1606: IEH  D    
Law 3058: IDH, royalties, participation
and patents  
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In 1994, the government passed Law 1606 that made significant modifications to the tributary 
system but kept the essence of the tributary regime established in 1986.  However, the main 
impact to the hydrocarbon sector was the creation of the Special Tax to Hydrocarbons and 
Derivatives (IEHD).  Finally, in 1996 Law 1731 was created that created the Tax to the 
Extraordinary Revenues related to the extraction and exploitation of non renewable resource 
(SURTAX).  These six specific taxes are applied to different stages of the production chain of 
the hydrocarbon activity.  Furthermore, depending on their characteristics of application, they 
can be classified as direct taxes and indirect taxes. 
 
On one hand, direct taxes are those taxes that are applied to the companies in general, in this 
case oil companies.  Among this taxes are IUE that account for 25 percent of the company’s 
profits, the IUE-RE that accounts for 12.5 percent of the total amount of profits that were 
shipped out of the country and SURTAX, which is an additional tax to the company’s profits 
of 25 percent of the extraordinary profits related to the extraction and exploitation of non 
renewable resources. 
 
The latter tax was created in order to compensate the government when activities related to 
the extraction and exploitation of non renewable resources are generating profits that doubled 
the amount invested in such activity.  It was also created to compensate the declining 
generation of hydrocarbon revenues caused by the decreasing trend in royalties taxed to 
existing hydrocarbons (50% in royalties). The decreasing tendency of existing hydrocarbon 
royalties is explained by the discovery and exploitation of new reserves that account only for 
18 percent of the production.  Therefore, according to former government of 1996, SURTAX 
should have generated resources that are considerably above the 32 percent of royalties that 
was removed from new hydrocarbons.  However, since its creation did not generate any 
income as was expected by the government in 1996, not even with the mega fields of San 
Alberto, San Antonio, Margarita and Itau
16. 
 
On the other hand, indirect taxes are those that generate income through the hydrocarbon 
sector but are not related to production activities or are taxed to the producer, the oil 
companies.  On the contrary, these taxes are taxed to the consumer, the population itself.  
They pay these taxes the moment they trade and consume any hydrocarbon derivative like 
gasoline and diesel or any other service related with hydrocarbons like transportation.  Among 
indirect taxes are IVA and RC-IVA that accounts each one for 13 percent of any imports, 
sales, purchases and services of hydrocarbons inside the country.  And finally, the IEHD 
which is the most important indirect tax of the hydrocarbon sector due to the significant level 
of contribution to the General National’s Treasury. 
 
The IEHD was created in 1994 to have a tributary instrument capable to generate at least the 
same amount of income obtained before the reforms of Law 1544, Capitalization Law.  This 
                                                 
16 According to Carlos Villegas, current Minister of Hydrocarbons and Energy, there are some prerequisites and 
conditions that will allow the generation of income through SURTAX.  First, it is the establishment of strong 
auditing mechanisms and institutions to control and monitor the financial movements and balance sheets of 
transnational companies operating in Bolivia.  Second, companies have to have revenues that doubled the capital 
invested.  Third, Surtax can be taxed only if the international oil prices do not decrease.  And fourth, Surtax will 
be charged if companies decide not to invest on the country.  
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tributary instrument taxes the commercialization of hydrocarbon products, nationals or 
imports, within the domestic market.  The IEHD taxes specific hydrocarbon products 
incorporating in its price a fixed aliquot set in Bolivians (national currency) that is annually 
updated according to the devaluation of the currency against the U.S. dollar. 
 
This tax is paid by every Bolivian when they consume any of the hydrocarbon derivatives.  It 
is very important to point out that the IEHD does not tax refineries due to its characteristic of 
indirect tax.  Refineries, in the case of IEHD, are the retention agent (Villegas: 2004).  In 
other words, they include the IEHD in their price before they sell the product to wholesalers 
and retailers and then they transfer the amount to the government. 
 
According to Villegas (2004) the IEHD has a very important particularity; the modification of 
the aliquot is annual and a decision of the Executive Branch via Supreme Decree with out the 
intervention of the congress.  In addition, it is also up to the Executive to add any other 
derivative of hydrocarbons to be subject of taxation.  In this sense, IEHD is managed at the 
discretion of the government in order to maximize tax collection.  This property of the IEHD 
makes it a powerful mechanism to adjust the capacity of income generation and contributions 
to the General National Treasury. 
 
6. Income Generation 
 
According to the Bolivian Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, the government income 
is built, among others, by two important components; regular income and income of capital.  
The latter is mainly consisted on donations and loan recoveries.  Within regular income, there 
are five main contributors: tributary income, hydrocarbon taxes, sales of goods and services, 
regular transfers and other regular incomes.  The tributary income is divided in internal rents, 
duty-pay rents and mining royalties.  And it accounts for almost 50 percent of the 
government’s income. 
 
The hydrocarbon sector represents almost 7 percent of the GDP for the country in terms of 
production, and is Bolivia’s currently main commodity export with about $ 1,321 million in 
2005 which represent half of total exports.  Just until June 2006, hydrocarbons contributed 
almost 34 percent of total revenues in the country where natural gas represents 75 percent of 
the total hydrocarbon exports in the sector.  
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The other contributors are mainly composed by sales of goods and services within the internal 
and external market, regular transfers from state enterprises and private sector, other regular 
incomes such as recovery of loans and income of capital which is mainly companies’ transfers 
and donations.  These contributors all together account for almost 17 percent of government’s 
income. 
 
These figures eloquently describe the importance of the hydrocarbon sector for the Bolivian 
economy.  Not only in terms of hydrocarbon reserves but also in terms of income generation 
for the country through the tributary system of the gas and oil sector. 
 
 
(1) Data until June, 2006. 
(2) From May 2005, hydrocarbon revenues include the IDH which account for 32 percent of total production. 
(3) Minerals include: Tin, Tungsten, Antimony, Lead, Zinc, Silver and Gold 
Non Traditional: include Sugar, Soy, Flour of soy, Cake of soy, Coffee, Wood, Leathers, Cotton, Oil of 
Soya, Jewelry, oily, garments, Crafts, Nuts, Heart Palms in Conserve, Wood Furniture and other derivatives 








Tributary Income Hydrocarbons (2)
Sales of Goods and Services Regular Transfers
Other Regular Income Capital Income
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Source: INE and BCB
Minerals Hydrocarbons Non Traditionals Other Goods 
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7. Hydrocarbon Revenues  
 
Given the complete set of tax 
instruments described earlier, since 1996 
until 2005, the hydrocarbon revenues 
structure consisted of royalties and 
participations, direct and indirect taxes 
including the IEHD.  Then, in 2005 it 
included the IDH. 
 
Figure 08 shows that in 2000, indirect 
taxes accounted for 57 percent of the 
hydrocarbon revenues of which IEHD 
accounted for a significant part at 44 
percent.  Royalties were about 38 
percent of the revenues and direct taxes 
only 5 percent of the sector’s revenues. 
 
On the other hand, in 2006, royalties and 
participations accounted for 20 percent 
of the hydrocarbon revenues, and 
indirect taxes for 25 percent, where the 
IEHD’s share was about 17 percent, a 
significant reduction since 2000. 
 
Since its conception until 2006, the IEHD plays a significant role in the sector’s tributary 
system, accounting for a significant share of the revenues.  As we saw previously, this tax was 
created to assure that the government’s inflow of income from the sector is at least the same 
as the previous period before the reforms of 1994. 
 
After 1994, the year when the capitalization process and the reforms to the sector shaped the 
energy policy of Bolivia, the main hydrocarbon instrument of income generation to the 
Nation’s Treasury was the IEHD and even now its importance is still valid.  However, it is 
very important to point out here that the IEHD, besides its characteristics as an indirect tax 
that is unrelated to production, is also a consumption tax that has to be paid regardless of any 
natural gas boom.  The creation of this instrument of indirect taxation was critical to support 
the changes made to the sector, allowed the break up of the state-owned oil company and 
therefore attracted direct foreign investment to the sector.  All these changes boosted the 
upstream production and incremented the natural gas reserves of the country. 
 
The IEHD is an important revenue-generating instrument not only for its significant 
contribution to the state, very close to royalties, but also for its characteristic of discretional 
management by the government in order to adjust and maximize tax collection from the 
hydrocarbon sector. 
 















Royalties and Participations Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes IEHD 
Source: Data from Ministry of Hydrocarbons, Ministry of Finance, SSI, 
UDAPE, BCB  
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Nonetheless, the management of the IEHD is very delicate in terms of what the population 
agrees and accepts as an acceptable increment of its aliquots.  As we said earlier, the IEHD is 
an indirect tax; consequently, the population is who pays the tax in every transaction related 
with hydrocarbon derivatives.  The IEHD taxes a variety of different hydrocarbon products 
that the government chooses.  In addition, their aliquot is made in a way that if the price of 
one of the products increases, the aliquots of every product will expand as well.  However, the 
intensity of the increment and the frequency is variable and at the discretion of the 
government (Villegas, 2004). 
 
However, its apparent diminution from 2000 to 2006 (Figure 10) is explained primarily by its 
particular characteristic as a flexible instrument of taxation and subject to manipulation by the 
government.  In this matter, the government, since 2000, had reestablished a subsidizing 
mechanism to freeze the domestic price of special gasoline, diesel oil and LGP the most used 
hydrocarbon derivatives at the domestic level (Napoleon, 2006).  Therefore and even though 
the government tried several times to liberalize its price to the market forces, concerns among 
the population that cannot afford high prices on hydrocarbon derivatives made the 
government step back on its decisions. 
 
In terms of direct taxes, Table 08 shows an irregular pattern that tends to increase since 2004.  
The irregular pattern of revenue generation through direct taxes is especially explained by the 
characteristic of the IUE.  The IUE taxes the enterprise’s profits.  Therefore, it depends on the 
government’s capability to monitor and audit the company’s financings and on the company’s 
willingness to share the information and accurately report its profits.  In this way, institutional 
transparency is essential for the sustainability of the direct taxes which, in general, account for 
less than 10 percent of the hydrocarbon revenues. 
 
Royalties and participations did increase, as shown in Figure 09, from more than 150 million 
in 2000 to more than 300 million of dollars in 2005.  However, this appreciation is merely in 
terms of the government’s take in general caused by the increment of production, but as a 
percentage of gross total sales at the well head, it decreased significantly from 33 percent in 
2000 to 19 percent in 2005 as a result of the new and existing hydrocarbons designation in 
former Law 1689 (Table 08). 
Figure 09: National Royalties and Participations (2000-2006) 









2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005(3) 2006(1)(2)
Source: Data from Ministry of Hydrocarbons
(1) Royalties and Partiicipations are collected until June
(2) From May to October there is an additional participation in favor of YPFB due to the 
Nationalization
Royalties Participations additional 32% for nationalization
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(1) Data collected until October
(2) IDH started to be collected since June of 2005 year when it was created
Source: SII and Ministry of Finance 
IEHD IDH (2) IUE IVA IT RC-IVA Other income 
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Finally, since 2005, the IDH has become the most important source of income from the oil 
and gas sector.  This appreciation is not only because it represents almost 50 percent of the 
hydrocarbon tax revenues but also because the IDH taxes the value of production as if it were 
a royalty rather than tax on profits.  This particularity makes it a more straightforward 
income-generating instrument for the Nation’s Treasury which facilitates the monitoring and 
auditing process of its collection process. 
 
8. Revenue Distribution System  
 
Bolivia has three important levels of administration.  The country is politically divided in 9 
departments, each with its own sub government called prefectura.  Each department is divided 
in different municipalities according to its territory; therefore; the number of municipalities 
per department varies completely.  In total, Bolivia is divided in 352 municipalities. 
 
Thus, resources are administered by three levels of government: central government, 
prefecturas and municipalities.  According to the Bolivian legislation, the two most important 
laws that regulate the transfer system of resources are Law 1654 (Administrative 
Decentralization) and Law 1551 (Popular Participation) and in terms of the hydrocarbon 
sector, Law 3058. 
 
Law 1551 classified the state income into three main groups: national, departmental and 
municipal incomes.  Making up the national income are national taxes like IVA, RC-IVA, 
IUE and IT that are applied to the hydrocarbon sector as well.  The current tributary system of 
Bolivia defines that the creation of taxes and the definition of their jurisdiction (national, 
departmental or municipal) is an attribute of the central government through the legislative 
and executive branches. 
 
In terms of departments, royalties are the only income-generation instrument for prefecturas.  
Prefecturas do not have judicial power to establish any tributary policy.  Central transfers 
from the central government are the second source of income for prefecturas; among them are 
funds provided by the Fondo Compensatorio Departamental/Compensatory Departmental 
Fund (FCD), a share of 25 percent of the total IEHD and the IDH.  Therefore, its role is 
limited to economic administration of the financial resource transfers from the central 
government. 
 
On the other hand, municipalities have the faculty to generate their own income by collecting 
specific taxes established by the central government according to the municipal jurisdiction; 
among them are property taxes and automobile taxes.  However, like departments, 
municipalities are not able to create and establish their own tributary system for income 
generation. 
 
The distribution and decentralization policies of Bolivia were created as part of the reforms 
that took place since the 1990’s including the capitalization process.  They were developed as 
part of the strategies that stabilized the country after the economic crisis of the 1980’s.   
However, after 13 years of implementation, there are still many complains about the  
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effectiveness of the measures at demanding a deeper decentralization process, as is seen in the 
case of the eastern regions of the country, which in addition are the wealthiest of Bolivia. 
 
These concerns are not limited to demands for more decision-making power by local 
governments, but also to solve the increasing vertical and horizontal financial disequilibrium 
that affects the Nation’s Treasury and the regions.   
 
A decentralization process that allows local governments to create and develop their own 
tributary system reflects the idea of a full decentralized system of financial and economic 
administration.  However, if the system is not articulated and regulated in some extent by the 
central government transfers, there is the risk of creating significant macroeconomic disorders 
due to the proliferation of doubled taxation and an inefficient low-potential system of 
collection (Pereira, 2006). 
 
According to Zapata (2005), Bolivia lacks of an efficient and equitable system of transfers.  
The reforms of the 1990’s have jeopardized the equilibrium of the system causing severe 
inequalities among regions.  His assertions point out that the distribution system of the 
country does not follow any criteria to enhance the quality of life of the populations and does 
not create incentives for local governments to generate their own income and efficiently 
deliver services. 
 
8.1. Departmental Distribution 
 
Royalties 
Figure 11 shows the share of each 
component in proportion to total 
revenues of the tributary system of the 
hydrocarbon sector that has to be 
distributed within the Bolivian 
regions.  As mentioned earlier, 
royalties and participations tax the 
production.  Thereafter, revenues are 
allocated within the producing regions 
as a compensation for the exploitation 
of the resource.  In this sense, non-
producing regions do not benefit from 
the hydrocarbon-production with the exception of Pando and Beni that are granted with one 
percent of the national production due to an historical agreement (Law 981). 
 
Hydrocarbon royalties are the first cause of horizontal disequilibrium among departments.  
According to Law 1551, royalties are considered as departmental income; however, the reality 
is that the natural resource was granted by nature.  However, in spite that every department in 
Bolivia has natural wealth, either minerals or forest resources if not hydrocarbons, there are 
regions that get a minimal source of income due to their low level of production. 
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From the total revenues on the upstream, the share of departmental royalties increased from 
30 percent in 2000 to 65 percent in 2005, representing a significant expansion in monetary 
resources for producing departments.  However, from the total royalties’ revenues the major 
beneficiary is Tarija, with more than seven times that of Chuquisaca, which is another 
producing department.  These figures show clearly the horizontal imbalances even between 
producing and non-producing departments only in terms of royalties (Figure 12). 
 
In order to compensate for horizontal financial disequilibrium, Law 1551 established the 
creation of the FCD with funds provided by the IEHD.  However, these funds must not 
exceed 10 percent of the total IEHD contributions.  The FCD was created to compensate those 
departments where the national average departmental royalty per capita is greater than its own 
per capita royalty revenues.  The compensation system of the FCD takes into account mining, 
timber and hydrocarbons royalties.  The mechanism to balance the horizontal disequilibrium 
within departments is basically based on population criteria. 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of Royalties within Departments(1) (2006)(2)











Source: Data collected from Ministry of Hydrocarbons
(1) Tarija, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Chuquisaca account for 11% of their production. 
Beni (2/3) and Pando (1/3) account for 1% of the national production.
(2) Royalties are colected until June 
Tarija Santa Cruz Cochabamba Chuquisaca Beni Pando
 
 
Until October 2006, the total revenue collected from the IEHD was approximately $206.42 
million.  Therefore, the FCD must not be more than $20.64 million, 10 percent of its total, to 
balance any disparity caused by royalties.  The total amount, however, needed to compensate 
for royalty-horizontal imbalances was 300 percent larger than the FCD’s funds, $75.82 
million dollars.  Consequently, we can observe that the FCD lacks capacity to achieve its 
main objective.  Table 02 shows that in 2006 five departments needed to be compensated; 
among them, the hydrocarbon producing departments, with the exception of Tarija.  The 
extraordinary amount of royalties going only to the department of Tarija uncovers the 
necessity to compensate not only non-hydrocarbon producing departments, but also the other 
three producing departments. 
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Table 02: FCD's Distributioin System in dollars (1)
Department Population (2) Hydrocarbon  Mining & other total National Departmental FCD's  Transfer Compensated per  capita
Royalties Royalties Royalties Factor (3) Factor (4) (5)(6) Transfer
Chuquisaca 531.522 4.088.339 2.289 4.090.628 18 8 5.720.635 9.811.263 18
La Paz 2.350.466 3.494.249 3.494.249 18 1 39.892.552 43.386.801 18
Cochabamba 1.455.711 14.801.822 213.953 15.015.775 18 10 11.854.916 26.870.690 18
Oruro 391.870 11.836.887 11.836.887 18 30 -4.603.434 30
Potosí 709.013 18.517.419 18.517.419 18 26 -5.429.884 26
Tarija 391.226 70.546.078 70.546.078 18 180 -63.324.512 180
Santa Cruz 2.029.471 18.400.375 804.453 19.204.828 18 9 18.256.788 37.461.616 18
Beni 362.521 6.535.532 57.764 6.593.297 18 18 98.409 6.691.706 18
Pando 52.525 3.267.776 167.242 3.435.018 18 65 -2.465.469 65
Total 8.274.325 117.639.923 35.094.256 152.734.179 75.823.299 124.222.076
Source: Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Unit of Programming (UPF) and INE
(1) Estimations were made using  the total IEHD-revenue until October of 2006 and according to Law 1654
(2) According to the Natioinal Census of 2001 
(3) It is the sum of total royalties by department divided by national population
(4) It is the total departmental royalties divided by the departmental population
Total IEDH 206.424.614,54
10% IEHD 20.642.461,45 27%
Deficit -55.180.838,03 -73%
(5) It is the difference between national and departmental factor multiplied by the departmental population.  It only applies if the difference is greater than 
zero (a positive value)
(6) The 10 percent of the IEHD barely have enough funds to compensate the hydrocarbon sector, but only three departments.  This exercise does not 
take into account mining and timber royalties, which according to Law 1654 must be taken.  
 
 
The IEHD  
Prefecturas also receive transfers from the central government that account for 25 percent of 
the total IEHD contributions.  The 25 percent of the IEHD’s contributions is divided in two 
parts.  50 percent is distributed based on population criteria, dividing the departmental 
population by the national population, and the other 50 percent is distributed in equal parts to 
every one of the nine departments without any economic, population, or poverty criteria, but 
assuming that every region has similar characteristics. 
 
Looking at the structure of the distribution system of the IEHD, it is noticeable that it causes 
the same problems of horizontal disequilibrium within departments.  Even though one part of 
the distribution is taking part in solving the per capita imbalances, where every person gets 
the same revenues in every department, the second component of the distribution creates the 
same problems mentioned above.  This transfer makes less populated departments get 
proportionally more resources than departments with significant population.  For instance, 
Pando gets in about 13 times more per capita resources than La Paz, Santa Cruz and 
Cochabamba, the most populated departments. 
 
Table 03: IEHD's Distributioin System in dollars (1)
Department Population (2) by Population by Territory IEHD's Transfer per capita 
Chuquisaca 531.522 1.657.525 2.867.009 4.524.534 9
La Paz 2.350.466 7.329.813 2.867.009 10.196.822 4
Cochabamba 1.455.711 4.539.563 2.867.009 7.406.572 5
Oruro 391.870 1.222.027 2.867.009 4.089.036 10
Potosí 709.013 2.211.022 2.867.009 5.078.031 7
Tarija 391.226 1.220.019 2.867.009 4.087.028 10
Santa Cruz 2.029.471 6.328.806 2.867.009 9.195.814 5
Beni 362.521 1.130.504 2.867.009 3.997.512 11
Pando 52.525 163.797 2.867.009 3.030.805 58
Total 8.274.325,00 25.803.076,82 25.803.076,82 51.606.153,64
Source: Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Unit of Programming (UPF) and INE
(1) Estimations were made using  the total IEHD-revenue until October of 2006 and according to Law 1654
(2) According to the Natioinal Census of 2001 
Total IEDH 206.424.614,54




Departmental Transfers of the IDH 
According to Law 3058, the IDH has to be distributed through direct transfers from the 
central government to prefecturas, municipalities, public universities and indigenous groups.  
The distribution system of the IDH is complex in terms that is divided in four stages.  The 
first stage distributes the IDH-revenues within producing, non-producing regions and the 
Nation’s Treasury directly without any criteria but political. 
 
On the second stage of distribution, the transfers are made within departments taking into 
account regional criteria within non-producing departments and production capacity within 
producing departments.  Within the central government, the IDH-revenues allocate resources 
into four different funds; the Compensatory Fund for Municipalities and Universities 
(CFMU), Indigenous and Campesinos Fund, Internal Aid for National Development Fund and 
the Army and Police Department. 
 
On the third stage, the IDH-revenues are distributed within prefecturas, municipalities and 
universities based again on political criteria.  Finally, the fourth stage distributes the IDH-
revenues within municipalities and universities, this time, based on population criteria. 
 
Figure 13: The IDH Distribution System
First Stage Third Stage
12.50% Tarija 
to producing departmets Santa Cruz 
according to its own production Chuquisaca  34.48% Municipalities (by population)
Cochabamba 
8.62% Universities
Pando   6.25%
Beni 6.25% 56.90% Prefecturas
31.25% La Paz 6.25%
non-producing departments Oruro  6.25%
based on region equity Potosi  6.25%
Indigenous and   5%
Campesinos Fund
80% Municipalities 
Compensatory Fund La Paz  46.19% (by population)
56.25% for Municipalities and  5% Santa Cruz 36.02%
Nation's Treasury Universities Cochabamba 17.79%
20% Universities

























































Second Stage Fourth Stage
 
 
Within the first and second stage of distribution, it can be observed in Table 04 that non-
producing departments get more resources than the producing ones creating concerns among 
producing regions.  In order to compensate for these disparities, Law 3058 stipulates the 
creation of an equalization formula funded by the Nation's Treasury.  In addition, Law 3058 
also stipulates the creation of the CFMU to compensate La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba 
due to their high population. 
 
Once direct transfers and compensations are done, every department basically gets the same 
amount of IDH-revenues.  However and even though the efforts made by the equalization 
formula, significant per capita inequalities persist.  In other words, looking at the per capita 
transfer, the horizontal disparities among departments remain significantly enormous.  For 
instance, Pando’s population is 2.6 percent of La Paz’s population, but La Paz receives only 
2.2 percent of Pando’s per capita resources.  Furthermore, the three largest departments, La  
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Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, get by far fewer per capita resources than the other 
departments. 
 
Table 04: IDH's Departmental Distribution System in dollars (1)
Direct Transfer Equalization Compensatory Fund Compensated Transfer  per capita
531.522 9.784.387 25.857.009 35.641.397 67
2.350.466 35.641.397 5.508.120 41.149.517 18
1.455.711 2.702.498 32.938.899 2.121.443 37.762.840 26
391.870 35.641.397 35.641.397 91
709.013 35.641.397 35.641.397 50
391.226 46.632.784 46.632.784 119
2.029.471 12.163.124 23.478.273 4.295.356 39.936.753 20
362.521 35.641.397 35.641.397 98
52.525 35.641.397 35.641.397 679
8.274.325 249.489.776 82.274.180 11.924.919 343.688.876
Source: Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Unit of Programming (UPF), INE
(1) Estimations were made using  the total IDH-revenue take at the well head until September of 2006 and according to Law 3058













IDH's Departmental Distribution System (2)
 
 
These figures show that the first and second stage of the IDH-revenue distribution is not 
created to reach, in an equitable manner, the needs of the poor population of the different 
regions of Bolivia.  On the contrary, they have highlighted the need of restructuring the IDH- 
distribution system.  Nonetheless, it is worth to draw attention to that the objective of the 
equalization formula is to compensate producing departments with fewer resources than non-
producing ones under regional basis and not at the per capita level. 
 
8.2. Municipal Distribution 
 
Two main transfers allocate resources at the municipal level of governance: the tributary-
revenue sharing/coparticipación tributaria (CT) and the third and fourth stages of the IDH-
transfers.  The CT is a common-bag of revenues funded by contributions of national taxes 
applied within the whole territory of Bolivia.  As it was mentioned in the tributary system 
section, the national taxes that collect revenues from the hydrocarbon sector are IUE, IVA, 
RC-IVA and IT. 
 
In 2005, revenues generated by the 
hydrocarbon sector in terms of national 
taxes accounted for 16 percent of the 
total national.  The collection capacity 
of the hydrocarbon tributary system 
depends on two types of instruments, 
direct and indirect taxation.  The IUE, 
a direct tax, represents the most 
significant contributor of the 
hydrocarbon sector because it taxes the 
net profits of the oil companies.  In 
2005, the hydrocarbon sector contributed with 32 percent of the IUE-national contribution.  
Therefore, as the hydrocarbon production increases, the oil and gas industry becomes more 
profitable and the state increases its revenue-take through the IUE.  On the other hand, the 
other taxes are also important but their collection capacity depends on the contribution  
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capacity of the population that commercializes and consumes hydrocarbon products, either 
imported or national. 
 
The distribution system of the CT benefits not only municipalities but also public universities.  
Municipalities receive 20 percent of the total revenues generated by national taxes.  The 20 
percent is distributed according to the number of inhabitants of each municipality.  On the 
other hand, Universities account for 5 percent of the national tax income which is distributed 
according to the departmental population. 
 
Municipal Transfers of the IDH 
In terms of the IDH-revenues, 56.90 percent of the departmental resources go to prefecturas, 
34.48 percent to municipalities and 8.62 percent to universities.  In addition, municipalities 
and universities of La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba get additional funds from the 
Compensatory Fund for Municipalities and Universities due to their high population.  From 
the CFMU funds, the department of La Paz is the beneficiary of 46.19 percent; Santa Cruz 
gets 36.02 percent and Cochabamba accounts for 17.79 percent.  The structure of these 
distribution does not respond to social criteria but political and increases the inequalities at the 
departmental level of governance. 
 
Within municipalities, the IDH-revenues are distributed according to population criteria, in 
this case taking into account the population of each municipality.  From Table 05, we can 
observe that before the compensation for municipalities and universities of high populated 
departments, every department gets the same amount of funds for their respective 
municipalities except Tarija that receives more resources.  However and even though the 
apparent equity among municipalities and the afore-mentioned compensation, it can be 
inferred that the IDH-transfer system causes serious disparities in terms of per capita 
distribution due to several factors like population, different number of municipalities within 
departments and different levels of poverty among municipalities and departments. 
 
Table 05: IDH's Municipal Distribution System in dollars (1)
Municipal's University's Total  Total
CFMU CFMU Municipalities Universities
20.279.955 12.289.154 3.072.288 12.289.154 3.072.288
20.279.955 12.289.154 3.072.288 4.406.496 1.101.624 16.695.650 4.173.912
20.279.955 12.289.154 3.072.288 1.697.155 424.289 13.986.308 3.496.577
20.279.955 12.289.154 3.072.288 12.289.154 3.072.288
20.279.955 12.289.154 3.072.288 12.289.154 3.072.288
26.534.054 16.078.984 4.019.746 16.078.984 4.019.746
20.279.955 12.289.154 3.072.288 3.436.285 859.071 15.725.438 3.931.360
20.279.955 12.289.154 3.072.288 12.289.154 3.072.288
20.279.955 12.289.154 3.072.288 12.289.154 3.072.288
188.773.691 114.392.212 28.598.053 9.539.936 2.384.984 123.932.148 30.983.037
Source: Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Unit of Programming (UPF), INE






















9. Analysis and Discussion 
 
According to what we observed earlier, it seems that natural resources like hydrocarbons 
became important for economic growth in terms of development especially for countries like 
Bolivia that needs important sources of revenues.  However, it is very important to keep in 
mind the historical evidence that shows that resource-poor countries developed much better 
than resource-rich countries (Sachs and Warner, 1997).  For instance, there are resource-poor 
economies like Japan and the Switzerland that performs better compared with other resource-
rich countries like Bolivia.  Researchers have found empirical evidence suggesting that there 
is a negative correlation between abundance of natural resources and economic growth 
(Gylfason, 2000; Sachs and Warner, 1997).   Gylfason implies that the reason behind these 
phenomena is the false sense of security and over confidence in their natural capital that 
allows economies of resource-rich states to operate with large margin of error when taking 
advantage of their resources.  
 
Further more; Sachs and Warner (1999) state that the fluctuated market of the energy sector 
jeopardized the source of income and the economic stability of resource-rich countries that 
rely on these commodities.  For instance, Andersen and Farris (2002) suggest that there are 
two main external problems that explain the negative correlation between natural resources 
and growth: volatile prices and Dutch disease.  The first one, volatile prices, explain that 
prices of such commodities, primary products, tend to be very fluctuating in the international 
market than manufacture goods.  This situation of uncertainty may lead with a non reliable 
source of income for the state due to the ups and downs of these prices in which primary 
products are dependent on; and therefore the economic stability of the country.  As an 
example, the collapse of the Bolivian economy in the mid 1980’s when the tin market 
collapsed leaving behind a damaged country. 
 
The second one, Dutch disease, is well know for its characteristic of shrinking other 
productive sector in the country.  Due to the enormous amount of foreign currency flowing 
into the country, the country’s currency tends to appreciate its exchange rate.  This situation 
rest competitiveness to other export sectors in the way that a higher price for its products, 
fewer incentives for buyers and therefore a decrease of its exports.  In other words, if 
international prices dropped and in addition the alternative export sectors are weak, nothing is 
left for the country to sustain its economy.  In this topic, using a CGE model of the Bolivian 
economy, Lykke E. Andersen (2006) has studied the distributional impact of natural gas 
resources and the possible changes in the Bolivian economy due to the increase of natural gas 
exports focusing on the changes in income distribution between different types of households 
and economic active sectors. 
 
Later studies show positive correlation between natural resources abundance and corruption 
which represent an obstacle for growth; especially if there is a large presence of weak 
institution at the government level (Leite and Weidmann, 1999).  Ross (2001) corroborates 
Leite and Weidmann and adds to the statement that social conflicts are likely to happen if the 
resource-rich country has weak government institutions and high poverty rates.  According to 
Herbst (2001), the reasons behind social unrest in resource-rich states rely on two scenarios:  
the social uncertainty of the revenue distribution and the social uncertainty of the equitable  
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distribution of the benefits through the country’s regions.  Also implied is the increasing 
number of competing groups that fight for the natural resource rents and benefits undermining 
the potential development of the state. 
 
Homer-Dixon (2004, p. 290) corroborates these findings by suggesting that the imbalance of 
natural resources in the form of abundance or scarcity is associated with conflicts among 
regions and countries; however, there are other significant contributing variables like 
jurisdictional limits within the country (departments, states or provinces) and administrative 
responsibilities as suggested by Cordonier et.al. (2002, p. 71-72) in particular inequitable 
access to natural goods for the majority of the beneficiaries that are often source of 
uncertainty and friction.   
 
Therefore, the government represents a 
crucial actor in terms of administration 
and management of its domestic 
production that in developing countries 
generally relies on natural resources.  The 
resources allocation and decentralization 
process is not only a matter of more 
decision-making power by local 
governments, but also about having the 
means to activate the economy and 
efficiently deliver goods and services that 
are under local governments’ jurisdiction.  
Decentralization is a transfer process of 
competencies according to the economic 
and financial capacity of local 
governments having significant 
repercussions on the country’s overall 
social and economic welfare.  In this 
sense, the decentralization efforts are in 
generally focused on establishing 
incentives for improves services, 
improving the welfare of the population 
and as a poverty reduction strategy. 
 
One important aspect of decentralization 
is allowing local governments to be part 
of their own development process 
supported by the central government.   
Therefore, reducing the dependency on 
government transfers becomes important 
not only for the decentralization itself but 
also to minimize the risk of local 
governments that rely on fluctuating 
income. 
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Currently, 92 percent of the prefecturas’ revenues come from government transfers.  The 
municipal dependency is also significant with 66 percent of their revenues relying on 
government’s transfers.  Nonetheless, it is noticeable that the legal authority that 
municipalities have to collect and administrate property and automobile taxes represent a 
significant impact reducing its dependency on central transfers.  However, it is also very 
noticeable that without transfers, prefecturas and municipalities would have serious vertical 
fiscal imbalances.  In other words, the expenditure levels of local governments by far excide 
their income generation capacity. (Figure 15) 
 
The stability of the transfer system correlates with the economic cycle of the country.   
Therefore, it becomes necessary to create policies that allow having continued flows of 
income regardless of economic booms due to, for instance, natural resources like 
hydrocarbons in Bolivia.  The hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia plays a significant role in the 
country because the sector’s significant capacity to generate revenues for the government. 
 
In terms of the hydrocarbon revenues and specifically the IDH, five departments are highly 
dependent on these funds.  For instance, in Chuquisaca, a hydrocarbon producing department, 
50 percent of their transfers are from the IDH; while 70 percent of its population lives in 
poverty.  The same situation we have in Oruro and Beni.  On the other hand, there are other 
departments with same levels of poverty, but fewer resources like La Paz, Potosi and even 
Cochabamba.  However, it is important to take into account that La Paz holds almost 2.5 
million of inhabitants where almost 70 percent of them live in poverty (1.5 million of people); 
almost the entire population of Cochabamba.  While Beni holds less than 362 thousands of 
people with more than 200 thousands living in poverty. 
 





















Source:General Control Office of the Republic, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Hydrocarbons
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This situation of transfer dependency jeopardizes the financial sustainability of those 
departments in the medium and long term.  These departments are not only depending on the 
IDH-transfers but in a large extent on the hydrocarbon production, which highly depends on 
foreign investment.  In addition, the lack of poverty criteria in the transfer system of revenues 
has the potential of undermine the country’s efforts of equity and poverty reduction.   


















hydrocarbon’s transfers, do not only aggravate vertical and horizontal imbalances but also 
generate severe transfer dependency. 
 
On the other hand, the reforms of 2005 and the introduction of the IDH also implied a one 
step ahead on the Bolivian process to decentralization.  Law 3058 allows local government to 
carry out with more public expenditures, as the revenue-sector allocation is very broad, 
liberating in this way the central government from this pressure.  However, it is very 
important to strengthen sector reforms by a re-definition of the distribution system of the 
hydrocarbon revenues, especially the IDH, and even more important to strengthen the 
administrative capacity of local governments to manage such amounts of resources. 
 
With the creation of the IDH, Bolivia generates significant amounts of resources where the 
direct beneficiaries are prefecturas and municipalities.  In this sense, these resources have to 
be channeled through policies to enhance democracy and the decentralization process within 
local governments promoting poverty alleviation to set the basis for sustainable economic 
growth. 
 
These transfers should in first place take into account the different levels of development and 
poverty of each region and sub region in the country.  In addition, it should take into account 
the different levels and degrees of governance, administrative, income-generation and 
spending capacity of each local government.  Central governments are in a significant extent 
responsible for the overall wellbeing of the country; therefore, transfers should be an 
instrument for central governments to close any disparity, support and encourage local 
governments for greater autonomy and participation of their own economic and social 
development. 
 
Consequently, it is recommendable to compare the level of central transfers with the level of 
poverty of each region to see the magnitude of the imbalances created.  Figure 17, shows that 
the design of the transfer system of the hydrocarbon sector does not recognize these 
differences in size and needs and creates significant per capita inequalities. 
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Royalties are distributed under regional criteria based on producing departments.  For 
instance, Tarija gets the majority of the benefits.  This situation, however, could be justified 
by the fact that the natural resource is in their region.  Nevertheless, it is also arguable the fact 
that they did not do anything to get it, the resource was already there, and even thought Law 
1551 has assigned royalties as their source of income it is also stated in the Bolivian 
Constitution (CPE) that natural resources belongs to the state and therefore to Bolivians 
(Article 136). 
 
In order to balance this horizontal disparity the FCD
17, which uses funds from the IEHD, was 
created so every region could reach the national average per capita royalty and get 
compensated for the random distribution of natural wealth.  Therefore, it is by definition a per 
capita equalizer transfer that currently has not accomplished its primary objective.  Currently, 
the FCD only has the capacity to compensate 20 percent of the royalty imbalances.  Among 
the reasons that explains the FCD’s lack of capacity is the incoherent criterion of using 10 
percent of other completely different source of resources, the IEHD, which simultaneously 
holds an active subsidize policy that restricts its tax-capacity of collection. 
 
Finally, the major concerns in terms of the hydrocarbon-transfer system relay on the IDH 
transfers.  These transfers have created such horizontal imbalances that the most populated 
regions receive in about 40 time less per capita resources than the less populated ones.  For 
instance, Pando and Tarija hold 1 and 5 percent of the total population respectively; however, 
they receive such extraordinary amount of resources compared with La Paz and Santa Cruz 
that hold 28 and 25 percent of the country’s population.  Even so, this situation could be 
justified only for Santa Cruz if we look at the share of poor and extremely poor people by 
region.  Santa Cruz has the lowest rates of poverty with less than 10 percent of people living 
in extreme poverty and 31 percent in poverty.  However, it cannot be justified for La Paz or 
the rest of the departments where the percentage of people living in poverty is above 60 
percent; and even more in cases like Potosi where almost 80 percent of its population live in 
poverty (more than 50 percent in extreme poverty).  Therefore, it is clear that the IDH transfer 
is aggravating the inequality among regions. 
 
Given such disparities, levels of poverty and population size by region, it becomes important 
to redefine the transfer system of revenues, in particular the hydrocarbon revenues that has 
significant representation on the overall economy of the country.  In this approach, the 
following exercise pretends to highlight and suggest likely reforms but not definitive changes 
to the transfer regime of the hydrocarbon sector.  Furthermore, the main objective of the 







                                                 




Re-structuring the Hydrocarbon Distribution System 
 
The distribution system of the hydrocarbon sector mainly consists on royalties, the 
compensatory formula (FCD), 25 percent of the IEHD, and the IDH.  In this exercise, the CT 
is not taking in to account because it compromises different other national taxes that are not 
applied to the hydrocarbon sector and their analysis should be done separately in future 
studies. 
 
The first possible reform should re-structure royalties and the FCD.  First of all, the 
incoherent criterion of consume funds from other totally different source like the IEHD to 
compensate horizontal-royalty imbalances creates a vicious and unnecessary additional fiscal 
pressure to the Nation’s Treasury.  This criterion creates an inefficient system to fund the 
FCD with resources coming from another tax-instrument that does not correlates with 
royalties and their capacity to generate income.  Royalties tax production and constitute an 
unconditional source of income for producing regions.  This aspect certainly prevents its uses 
out side of the producing region that might be socially or economically more beneficial for 
not so lucky regions or the whole nation.  Furthermore, royalties and the IEHD do not 
correlate even within their jurisdiction.  The IEHD is paid by the whole populations to 
compensate inequalities created by royalties that only benefit producing regions rather than 
the rest of the nation.  In one sense, this incoherence makes Bolivians from non-producing 
regions pay to compensate other producing regions.  Consequently, this aspect does not create 
incentives for fiscal accountability and responsible public spending due to the fact that 
royalties and the FCD are basically granted. 
 
However, because royalties are historically given to producing regions; therefore, it is not 
viable or even desirable to totally drain these funds from their beneficiaries due to possible 
internal concerns and conflicts.  Nonetheless, what indeed is possible, and in some extent 
desirable, should be to use royalty resources to compensate the disequilibrium that they 
themselves are creating.   For instance, if a department produces more than 50 percent of the 
national production of a specific resource, for instance Tarija in the case of natural gas, the 
difference should be given to compensate for horizontal inequalities in terms of royalties.  In 
this way, as production increases, the FCD also does.  In addition, specifically speaking in 
terms of the hydrocarbon sector, the 6 percent participation that goes to the Nation’s Treasury 
should be also used to fund the FCD under the same idea. 
 
In this manner, the FCD does not rely on another source of resources that does not have any 
correlation with royalties and production.  Moreover, producing regions would have more 
incentives for fiscal accountability and efficient spending because they will have to give away 
part of their income that once was completely granted.  In this aspect, in 2006, the total 
amount collected by the IEHD would have been, entirely, at disposition of the central 
government.  Only 25 percent of it would have been transferred to prefecturas as it is stated in 
Law 1654; therefore, 75 percent would have remained in the Nation’s Treasury for central 
government expenditures. 
 
Within these changes, Tarija is the main player in these reforms.  Tarija is the only producing 
region that accounted for more than 50 percent of the national hydrocarbon production in  
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2006, approximately $641 millions (65%).  Therefore, Tarija under these terms would have to 
give up around 15 percent of its royalties.  The second main player in this alternative is the 
central government.  They would have to accept to use its 6-percent share of hydrocarbon 
production to fund the FCD in order to balance the inequalities created by royalties. 
 
In this aspect, Table 06 shows that the government’s take in 2006 was approximately $421 
millions including the 6-percent participation of the central government after have transferred 
35 percent of the IEHD and 60 percent of the IDH.  With the alternative mentioned, however, 
the government’s take for the same year, 2006, would have accounted for 75 percent of the 
IEHD and 50 percent of the IDH.  Therefore, the total government’s take would have been 
$439 millions, 4 percent more than in current situation.  Given these reforms, the FCD would 
have accounted, in 2006, with the necessary funds to compensate the inequalities created by 
the royalty system.  In the same manner, the rest of the departments would have benefited 
from the compensation.  However, it is very important that departments, in this case Tarija, 
accept a shortfall in revenues from royalties due to the modifications in order to benefit the 
rest of the regions and balance the horizontal disparities. 
 
Transfers Total Revenue
Current (1) Alternative (2)
Total IEDH 206,424,614.54 134,175,999.45 154,818,460.91
Total IDH 570,262,345.80 228,104,938.32 285,131,172.90
6% Royalties 58,819,971.27 58,819,971.27
Total 835,506,931.62 421,100,909.05 439,949,633.81
Table 06: Central Government's Share of IEHD, IDH and Royalties in 
dollars (2006)
Government Take
Source: Estimations were done with data from the Ministry of Hydrocarbon and 
Finance
(1) 10% and 25% of the IEHD are direct transfers.  The central government keeps 
65% of the IEHD
(2) The alternative suggests that only 25% of the IEHD should be a transfer; 
therefore, the central government would keep 75% of the IEHD  
 
The selection of an appropriate distribution system of revenues in terms of central transfers is 
challenging due to the fact that transfers often have several objectives and in some cases very 
inconsistent.  However, there are three primary objectives to take into account when transfers 
are created; correct vertical and horizontal imbalances and encourage and create incentives for 
local governments for a better spending program.  That in mind, it is recommendable to 
recognize differences among departments in terms of regions, population and especially the 
poverty level of the country in order to make sound public policies on behalf of the 
population.  For instance, in 2001 Law 2235 was created to establish mechanisms to regulate 
the distribution of the Highly Indebt Poor Countries (HIPC) funds under poverty criteria and 
vertical balance.  The HIPC funds are the only Bolivian transfer that account for poverty 
criteria to allocate resources within regions.  That said and in light of this experience, it is 
possible to emulate such criteria using the IDH-revenues that represent an important source of 
resources as we saw earlier. 
 
The IDH is a special instrument that taxes the hydrocarbon production.  It was created after 
several protest and concerns from the population and supported by the Energy Referendum of 
2004 in order to increase the government’s take of the sector’s revenues to not less than 50  
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percent of the production complementing the royalty regime.  Within these circumstances, it 
is recommended that this transfer should be used by the central government to support and 
encourage local governments to accomplish their poverty reduction agenda and satisfy the 
needs of the most vulnerable share of the population. 
 
Therefore, it is strongly recommendable that the IDH-transfer should be distributed taking 
into account poverty criteria given the circumstances of its creation and high level of poverty 
in the country.  However, because the IDH represents almost 50 percent of the total 
hydrocarbon revenues, a significant source of resources, it is also recommendable to maintain 
regional and production criteria for its distribution, in order to minimize concerns and 
conflicts among regions, especially producing regions.  That said, one possibility of re-
structuring the IDH distribution system is explained in the following figure.  The distribution 
follows three criteria; production and regional criteria due to the importance of the IDH.  The 
third criterion and most significant is poverty criteria to benefit the poorest areas of the 
country. 
 
Figure 18: Alternative Distribution Structure of the IDH
First Stage Second Stage
5% Tarija 
to producing departmets Santa Cruz 
according to its own production Chuquisaca  40% Municipalities 
Cochabamba  (by population criteria )
9%
by regional criteria nine 10% Universities
1% each department department
50% Prefecturas
86%
by poverty criteria by
number of people living in poverty department
Indigenous and   5%
Campesinos Fund
National Development  5%













The poverty criteria used in this exercise to estimate poverty incidence is the method of the 
Unmet Basic Needs (UBN), which is the same used in the HIPC funds.  The UBN method is 
based primarily on deprivation indices to assessing situations of absolute poverty.  It 
combines four significant groups: i) quality of housing in terms of construction materials of 
floors, walls and ceilings and overcrowded rooms, ii) Services like water supply, sanitation, 
electricity and cooking energy consumption, iii) Education in term of years, school attendance 
and illiteracy and iv) Health coverage, formal and informal, and social security. 
 

















ED PD D tyX Municipali
n
n x n
n n n n % 86 % 1 % 5 % 40  
Where: 
Dn = Department n 
PDn = Producing Department n by production 
EDn = each one of the nine departments 
DnPP = Department n Poor Population 
NPP = National Poor Population 
MxPDn = Municipal Population of Department n 
DnP = Population of Departmental n 
Xn = Municipality X from department n 
n = number of the department, from 1 to 9 
 
Given these possible changes in the distribution system of the hydrocarbon sector (royalties, 
FCD and specially the IDH), Figure 19, shows the results of the hypothetical reforms that 
were estimated based on preliminary data of the total hydrocarbon revenues collected in 2006. 
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With these changes we can observe a more significant per capita balance between 
departments.  However, it is also visible that Pando and Tarija still receiving significant 
resources compared with the rest of the departments.  This situation is due to the 
extraordinary amount of royalty resources of Tarija and the low level of population in Pando.  
Nonetheless, the per capita horizontal imbalances within departments are significantly 
smoothed compared with current situation. 
 
The department most affected by these changes is Pando with a shortfall in revenues of almost 
86 percent, which actually might represent a significant loss for the department from $35 to 
$5 million approximately.  Beni, Tarija and Oruro would have to accept a shortfall of almost 
50 percent; and Potosi and Chuquisaca, 12 and 37 percent respectively to benefit La Paz, 
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz with 97, 20 and 11 percent of windfall. 
 
However, despite of that the aggregated result of this exercise might look radical and 
unfavorable for some regions, it is important to keep in main that exist significant differences  
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in population among departments.  As mentioned earlier, the total poor population of only the 
department of La Paz is comparable with the total population of Cochabamba.  Furthermore, 
the total population of Pando represents less than 4 percent of the total poor population of La 
Paz, 52,525 compared to 1,556,008 respectively.  For that reason, it is evident that the current 
system of distribution does not take poverty variables, not even population variables, in its 
equation at the early stages, which creates a discriminatory sense of distribution among region 
where few people of some region gets the most of the hydrocarbon benefits as compared with 
other regions with more than 90 percent more poor population. 
 
Viability, Opportunities and Conditions for Reforms 
 
The situation of the hydrocarbon sector in Bolivia is not yet consolidated.  Since the sector 
reforms were enacted in 2005, the new version of the hydrocarbon law (Law 3058) and the 
nationalization decree of 2006, the government is still on a very delicate process to 
consolidate and regulate the sector’s activities in terms of production and the distribution 
system of revenues.  This situation gives the government a significant advantage to still 
adjusting some of the topics explained earlier.  In addition, Bolivia is currently going through 
a process of re-writing the national constitution. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the CPE states that natural resources belong to the state and therefore to 
their citizens; in addition, it stipulates that the hydrocarbon reserves, in any stage of condition 
(in production or not, under or on the surface), belong to the state (Article 136 and 139).  It 
also complements by saying that the state shall classify the departmental, municipal and 
central income by law (Article 146).  Within this political, social and legal context, the 
opportunities of the country to success on this purpose are significantly high. 
 
However, it is very important to clarify that the new constitution should be about rights, 
values and democratic processes, but in any case, about public policies.  In other words, the 
constitution is the blueprint of societies with fundamental values detailing the essence of the 
relationships between citizens and the state.  It shall call and support equal opportunity for 
every citizen, and should be based in shared values within the society (King, 2006).  In 
addition, the new constitution shall describe in detail the role of the government and its 
institutions, in other words, the government’s responsibility to their citizens.  The new 
constitution should set the basis for deeper decentralization process within local governments 
to allow them to be part of their own development for a better and more efficient way of 
delivering goods and services directly to the population. 
 
The Bolivian legislation stipulates that the central government is the entity in charge of 
making sector reforms that affect the macro stability of the country.  However, in light of the 
level of poverty of the country and the current democratic process of Bolivia, writing a new 
constitution, these significant changes to the hydrocarbon distribution system that affect not 
only producing but also non-producing regions, should be approved by the nation as whole, 
the population.  The democratic process in which Bolivia is currently placed significantly 
empowers the citizens.  Therefore, the opportunity to set the basis for a fair society 
establishing the framework for a unified country under equal opportunities and inclusion is 
certainly there.  
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Figure 20: Departments' IDH Expenditure in million of dollars
IDH Resources Total Expenditure
 
That said, it is important to point out that the constitution’s opportunity is critical to 
strengthen the Bolivian values and willingness to act in accordance with the sacrifices needed 
to form a compact society pursuing the welfare of the whole nation, but not to write public 
policies or changes like the ones described above.  Bolivia’s current conjuncture, the new 
socialist government, the extraordinary hydrocarbon revenues and the new constitution, 
represent a one-chance opportunity for the country to set the basis of a new nation. 
 
In terms of the IDH, there are two important aspects to take into account for the success of the 
reforms.  First, as mentioned before, departments have to accept a shortfall in revenues from 
the IDH.  Otherwise, without this recognition on behalf of the others departments, it is 
virtually impossible balance the significant horizontal inequality. 
 
In additoin, according to the 
the Ministry of Finance, in 
2005, prefecturas and 
municipalities showed an 
enormous surplus in their 
IDH-accounts (Figure 20), 
which represent an 
extraordinary situation in 
case that it meant that they 
had an impeccable spending 
program.  However and 
sadly, it does not mean that.  
The reality is that prefecturas 
and municipalities have a significant limited administrative and expenditure capacity due to, 
primarily, the lack of technical capacity.  Table 07, shows the objective and sector allocation 
of each central transfer to local governments.  From this table we can conclude that the 
transfer of competencies and responsibilities are often too broad to accomplish for small and 
medium size municipalities that more often represent a significant challenge even for large 
municipalities like La Paz and Santa Cruz. 
 
This situation calls for an immediate respond of the central government in terms of 
investment in capacity building before let small local governments administrate significant 
amount of resources.  Otherwise, the situation could turn into a high level of corruption within 
local governments.  For instance, Tarija with 5 percent of the Bolivian population and 11 
municipalities has accumulated more than $20 million in its account.  In the contrary, La Paz 
with almost 25 percent of the total population and 80 municipalities has accumulated less than 
$20 million. 
 
However, this surplus in IDH funds can be favorable for the success of the distribution system 
reforms due to the enormous amounts of resources that remain in prefecturas and 
municipalities’ accounts.  This surplus situation certainly smoothes the transition process of 
re-structuring the transfer system of the IDH.  Consequently the financial impact would be 
minimal.  In addition, from this perspective, as local governments are increasing their IDH- 
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revenues in their banking accounts, prefecturas and municipalities do not experience any 
revenue loss through the reforms. 
 
That said, it is conclusive that exist favorable opportunities to introduce the necessary reforms 
to improve the transfer regime of the hydrocarbon sector for a better and more equitable 
distribution of the oil and gas revenues.  However, it is also recommendable to analyze other 
alternatives and study the best approach to implement the reforms.  A gradual implementation 
could be important for technical, and even more important, for political reasons due to the 
necessity of some regions to accept a shortfall on their income as well as the central 
government. 
 
There is a remarkable lack of clear policies in terms of energy, economic and social 
development in the hydrocarbon sector’s tax distribution system in Bolivia.  This situation is 
creating significant horizontal disparities among departments and municipalities where the 
latter represents the most important level of governance for strategic development and poverty 
reduction efforts since the decentralization process of 1994. 
 
The energy sector, in Bolivian, plays a critical role in the country because it is intricately 
woven with not only production and consumption of energy but also with access to resources, 
level of poverty, social, economic, political and environmental issues.  As mentioned in the 
historical background section, the Bolivian hydrocarbon sector went through three 
nationalizations since its conception.  Its legislation was reformed several times without 
significant changes on the most vulnerable population of Bolivia, the poor.  The sector was 
and is also considered a strategic political instrument to request access to the Pacific Ocean 
with Chile.  Furthermore, with the global increase in oil prices, the current nationalization 
efforts of Bolivia and the increasing revenues from the sector, the country has an important 
opportunity to bridge the connections between energy and development. 
 
Overall, since the point of view of development and in light of the Bolivian experience and 
poverty level, the benefits of the energy sector at least in the developing world, no longer 
should be consider as a result of economic development but as a mechanism to increase the 
capacity of developing countries to promote social welfare and economic growth and as a 




The analysis of the Bolivian hydrocarbon sector from historical, social and economic 
perspectives shows that without doubts, Bolivia highly depends on the revenues from the 
sector.  In addition, there are touchable arguments that justify the significant role of the sector 
in the country, among them the conflict with Paraguay, the use of the sector as potential 
instrument of negotiation to recover sovereignty and access to the Pacific Ocean, the 
geopolitical situation that place Bolivia as an important player in a possible energy integration 
as the holder of the second largest reserves of natural gas in the region and the sever degree of 
poverty in the country that makes Bolivia significantly needed for resources. 
 
The report concludes that the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector was indeed a 
necessary measure that had significant reasons for the country in order to reverse the 
unfavorable share of revenues that progressively declined from almost 50 percent to 18 
percent of the production.  It is interesting to reflect how for ten years former governments 
and international financial institutions tried to justify that unfavorable situation by promising 
that foreign investment in the sector, over any other measure, would benefit the country. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to point out that certainly were significant efforts and measures to 
decentralize and encourage for more popular participation in the decision-making process of 
governance.  However, what is contradictory is the fact that the privatization of the oil and gas 
sector allowed transnational companies to take advantage of the non-renewable resource of 
the country in the sense that undeniably hydrocarbon reserves and production enormously 
increased but the government’s share of the revenues significantly decreased in the same 
period of time.  Therefore, we can assume that without the nationalization the figure would 
continuously deteriorate as production will eventually decline as companies will drain the 
non-renewable resource (transnational oil companies accounted for 82 percent of the 
production whereas the government accounted for 18 percent in 2005). 
 
In this aspect, one conclusion is that in fact, the country decreased its share of the 
hydrocarbon revenues.  This asseveration certainly weakens the argument that the country 
always had more than 18 percent of revenues taking into account however direct and indirect 
taxes.  In order to analyze the complex tributary system of the sector, it is important to define 
the jurisdiction of direct and indirect taxes, profit and production taxes.  In this aspect, 
royalties as the only mechanism that taxes production from 1996 to 2005 certainly decreased 
the government’s take to 18 percent. 
 
Therefore, one of the main conclusions that can be drawn from this report is that the role of 
the government is vital for the success of any sector reform chosen by developing countries.  
In this aspect, if governments lack of transparent and strong institutions to regulate, rule and 
administrate the variety of agreements and contracts of any sector reform, the most affected 
will not be governments, political parties or Private Corporation but the population, and even 
worst, the most vulnerable, the poor.  Therefore, the discussion should be directed to which 
system is better for the welfare of the population. 
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Moreover, another conclusion is that to allow the privatization process and maintain the same 
amount of income, at least the first years of implementing the reforms, the tax burden was 
purposely shifted from oil companies to consumers, Bolivians.  This measure was 
implemented as a mechanism to attract foreign direct investment to the sector.  With the 
classification of existing and new hydrocarbons, former government reduced the companies’ 
tax burden; and with the creation of the IEHD, the government shifted that responsibility to 
the population.  In this manner, since 1996, the Bolivian population has financed the 
privatization process of the oil and gas sector without seeing the benefits. 
 
In terms of resource allocation, the report also concludes that the distribution system of the 
hydrocarbon revenues is not evenly distributed within the country’s regions.  The current 
system of revenue allocation (specially the IDH) creates significant per capita inequalities 
within regions ($16 dollars per capita in La Paz vs. $600 dollars per capita in Pando).  In 
addition, the current distribution system which is based on political criteria with some extent 
of regional notion of fairness discriminates the allocation of resources without taking into 
account any poverty criteria.  In such poor country like Bolivia the lack of poverty criteria in 
the distribution system of such significant resources makes 1.5 million of poor people from La 
Paz get fewer resources than almost 300 thousand poor people from Pando in terms of per 
capita distribution. 
 
Despite of the government’s efforts to equalize the enormous horizontal disequilibrium 
created by royalties with the FCD, the incoherent criterion of using 10 percent of other 
completely different source of resources, the IEHD, which simultaneously holds an active 
subsidize policy that restricts its tax-capacity of collection creates an inefficient use of 
resources and an unnecessary fiscal pressure to the Nation’s Treasury.  For this reason, we 
believe that is highly recommendable to fund the FCD with sources that come from royalties 
rather than from another tax instrument that does not correlates with production.  For instance, 
the FCD could be funded by the 6 percent of the government’s royalty.  In addition, if one 
department holds more than 50 percent of the total national production like Tarija, the 
difference should be used to fund the FCD.  Given these changes, the FCD would correlate 
with production.  Therefore, if production and royalties increase, the FCD would do so and 
have the capacity to compensate for royalty imbalances. 
 
Additionally, the most important instruments of taxation, royalties and IDH, exacerbate the 
regional dependency on central transfers that depends on exhaustible and unstable 
hydrocarbon production (92 percent of the prefecturas’ revenues and 66 percent of the 
municipalities’ revenues come from government transfers).  The report also conclude that the 
decentralization process of the country has several weaknesses in terms that it does not allow 
local governments to create their own tributary policies and generate their own income, with 
exception of municipalities that in some extent can administrate and collect two regional taxes 
defined by the central government. 
 
However, this transfer dependency certainly jeopardize the financial stability of local 
governments, does not offer any incentive for efficient use of resources and creates the basis 
for corruption nucleus within local government that certainly knows that every year will get 
those transfers without any effort.  
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These transfers should in first place take into account the different levels of development and 
poverty of each region and sub region in the country.  In addition, they should take into 
account the different levels and degrees of governance, administrative, income-generation and 
spending capacity of each local government.  Central governments are in a significant extent 
responsible for the overall wellbeing of the country; therefore, transfers should be an 
instrument for central governments to close any disparity, support and encourage local 
governments for greater autonomy and participation of their own economic and social 
development. 
 
One important aspect of decentralization is allowing local governments to be part of their own 
development process supported by the central government.  Therefore, reducing the 
dependency on government transfers becomes important not only for the decentralization 





Table 07: The Hydrocarbon Revenue Transfer Regime
Type of Transfer Source of Resource Recipeint Objective Distribution Criteria  Sectoral Allocation
Hydrocarbon Royalties





Compensate for the 
exploitation of the natural 
resource
According to production 
capacity and only to 
producing departments 
with exception of Pando 
and Beni (1% on national 
production; two thrids and 
one third respectively)
85% to public investment in 
areas of: road infrastructure, 
rural electrification, agricultural 
infrastructure, research and 
technology, environmental 
conservation, tourism, social 
welfare and municipal 
strengthening






due to hydrocarbon, 
mining and timber 
royalties
Population criteria to reach 
the average national per 
capita royalty
85% to public investment in 
areas of: road infrastructure, 
rural electrification, agricultural 
infrastructure, research and 
technology, environmental 
conservation, tourism, social 
welfare and municipal 
strengthening
IEHD 25% of IEHD
Departments 
(prefecturas)
Financial support to 
prefecturas
50% distributed under 
population criteria, 
50% distributed equally 
among the departments
85% to public investment in 
areas of: road infrastructure, 
rural electrification, agricultural 
infrastructure, research and 
technology, environmental 
conservation, tourism, social 
welfare and municipal 
strengthening
IDH







public health, road 
infrastructure and 
employment 
12.5 distributed to 
producing departments, 
31.25 to non-producing 
departments.  
Thereafter, 56.9 to 
prefecturas, 34.48 to 
municipalities and 8.25 to 
universities
Prefecturas: economic and 
social development and 
collective security
Municipalities: education, 




and academic equipment, 
academic quality 
improvement, research and 
technology, social porgrams 
for vulnerable and poor 
population
CT





compensate for vertical 
imbalances
20% to municipalities and 
5% to universites 
85% to public investment 





Table 08: Hydrocarbon Revenues Structure in million of dollars
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (8) 2006(9)
Royalties and Participations 166.2 188.1 172.5 219.3 286.4 317.4 239.7
Departmental Royalties 12% 56.43 71.42 70.34 98.44 140.80 196.78 117.64
Participation YPFB 6% (1) 30.68 37.02 36.25 48.23 65.39 92.29 0.00
Additional Participation YPFB 32% (2) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 63.25
Participation TGN 6% (1) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 58.82
RNC and PN (existing hydrocarbons/Law1689) (3) 79.14 79.69 65.87 72.58 80.21 28.35 n/a
Total Taxes 273.0 269.6 239.3 240.2 288.1 413.7 422.4
Direct Taxes 22.3 36.5 24.6 34.0 50.0 85.3 120.2
Indirect Taxes 250.7 233.1 214.8 206.2 238.2 328.4 302.2
IDH (4) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 289.37 570.26
IEHD 192.70 169.22 160.27 135.20 142.77 231.76 206.42
IUE 22.35 36.51 24.56 34.01 49.98 85.30 120.17
IVA 33.49 41.95 29.30 43.77 45.02 50.87 59.45
IT 22.07 18.93 21.75 23.05 40.42 41.23 29.61
RC-IVA 2.38 2.37 2.72 3.29 3.25 3.55 2.64
SURTAX (5) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other income 0.02 0.59 0.74 0.85 6.70 0.95 4.07
Total Revenues from the sector  439.26 457.70 411.80 459.43 574.55 1020.46 1232.34
Gross Total Sales at the Well Head(*)  508.60 593.80 586.90 820.40 1173.30 1640.70 980.33
Royalties' share 33 32 29 27 24 19 24
Direct Taxes' share (6) 4 644 4 5 1 2
Indirect Taxes' share (6) 49 39 37 25 20 20 31
IDH's share - --- - 18 58
IEHD's share (7) 38 28 27 16 12 14 21
(*)Total sales at the well head from Mauricio Medinaceli et al (2006). "La Nacionalizacion Bajo la Lupa."  Total sales of 2006 was estimated according  to data from the Ministry of Hydrocarbons  
(1) Before May, 2005 this 6% participation was transferred to the Nation's General Treasury after deducting the necessary funds to cover YPFB's budget for the administration of contracts.  After May, 
2005 the particapations is on behalf of the Nation's General Treasury
(2) The nationalization Decree 28701 of 2006 mandated a transitional participation for YPFB accounting for 32% of the production of fields where production is above 100,000 MMCFD 
Source: Royalties and Participations from the Ministry of Hydrocarbons
Taxes from the Ministry of Finance, SSI, UDAPE's statistics dossier 1988-2005 and BCB's statistics 1999-2005
(3) The Complementary National Royalty (RNC) of 13% and the National Participation (PN) of 19% were only paid by existing hydorcarbons as it is stipulated in Law 1689.  After May, 2005 there were 
not differences between existing and new hydrocarbons
(4) The IDH was effective since May, 2005 as disposed on Law 3058
(5) SURTAX is a direct tax that accounts for 25% of the company's extraordinary profits related to exploitation activities of non renewable resources that doubled the amount 
investment.  It was created in 1996 to compensate the state for the decreasing royalties taxed on existing hydrocarbons.  However, since its creation it did not collect any income (see 
secion 6 of the report)
(8) Law 3058 has been effective since May, 2005.  Before May, 2005, former Law 1689 was effective
(6) It takes into account taxes from Law 843 and 1731 that regulate the Bolivian tributary system and are applied to the hydrocarbon sector: IVA, RC-IVA, IT, IUE, SURTAX and others.  The percentage 
is in relation to gross total sales at the well head for comparison reasons
(7) The IEHD has a significant importance on the hydrocarbon sector due to its flexibility to be managed by the government and because it is an indirect tax.  The IEHD is taxed to the 
population the moment they use any hydrocarbon derivative for any activity like transportation
(9) Data was collected until June and October for Royalties and Taxes respectively  
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